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Abstract
The literature on real business cycles finds that one reason why emerging
economies are more volatile than developed small open economies is that they
face greater financial frictions. Indeed, according to several measures of financial
depth and access, financial systems in emerging countries are on average less
developed than those in developed small open economies. Despite the lag in
financial development, private credit, particularly unsecured credit to households,
has been steadily increasing during the last two decades in emerging countries in
Latin America.
During this period of rising credit, various countries in the region observed an
increase in the size of their middle income class population and the emergence of
the vendor financing channel in their consumption credit market. Estimates by
the World Bank suggest that the share of middle class households increased from
20.9 % in 1995 to 40.7 % in 2010. In addition, the share of poor households was
approximately halved and reached 23.4 % at the end of this 15 year period. This
phenomenon not only increased credit demand but also motivated the entry of
new suppliers in the consumer credit market in countries like Mexico, Colombia,
Chile and Brazil. In spite of a significant decline in unemployment in recent years,
the lack of formal employment and poor credit history were still impeding many
individuals from gaining access to consumer finance from traditional financial
institutions. In order to enable new middle class shoppers access items typically
offered by large retail stores, the retailers themselves started offering credit.
In this dissertation, I study the relationship between middle class size,
unsecured credit markets and aggregate consumption volatility in emerging
countries. In the first chapter of this thesis, we examine the link between middle
class size and consumption growth volatility using a sample of middle income
countries. In the second chapter, we study the effect of an expansion of the middle
class on vendor financing incentives and unsecured credit supply on its extensive
margin. In the third chapter, I study business cycle implications of a reduction in
the share of financially excluded households in an emerging economy.
In the first chapter, I empirically examine the effect of middle income class
size on consumption growth volatility in emerging countries. Using a panel data
of middle income countries, I find that a larger middle class size tends to increase
aggregate consumption growth volatility, particularly at lower levels of financial
system depth. Financial development plays a significant role in determining the
sign of the marginal effect of middle class size on aggregate volatility. Unlike
emerging countries, the effect of the size of the middle class and the role of financial
development on consumption volatility in developed countries is ambiguous. The
key message of this analysis is that as more households escape poverty thresholds
and reach the middle income class status in developing and emerging economies,
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it becomes more important to deepen financial systems from the perspective of
aggregate consumption volatility.
In the second chapter, I explore through the lens of a theoretical model,
potential reasons triggering an increase in credit supplied by the non traditional
financial sector, i.e vendors, at the extensive margin. I find that a reduction in
the average risk of default and an increase in the market size of credit customers
raise vendor financing incentives. This model rationalizes the observation that the
improvement of economic conditions of the low-income and financially constrained
households potentially led to increased credit supply by vendors in several
countries of Latin America.
In the third chapter, I study business cycle implications of a decline in
household financial exclusion in a dynamic general equilibrium model suitable
for emerging economies. Using Mexico as a case study, I estimate the model with
Bayesian methods for the period 1995 to 2014. Standard measures of predictive
accuracy suggest that the extended business cycle model with limited credit market
participation outperforms a model with zero financial exclusion. The results of
the estimation suggest that a rise in credit market participation in an emerging
economy increases aggregate volatility of key macroeconomic aggregates, and that
financial frictions play a key role in this relationship. I confirm this prediction
by re-estimating the model for Mexico after splitting the sample into two non-
overlapping decades. A key implication derived in this chapter is that a reduction
of financial exclusion within an emerging country may lead to higher consumption
growth volatility and trade balance volatility, and that fewer financial frictions
dampen the marginal effect. As household financial access increases in these
countries, a greater need for improving broad financial development measures
arises.
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Chapter 1
Inequality and volatility in developing countries
1.1 Introduction
According to a recent publication by the World Bank (Ferreira et al.,
2013), Latin America -historically recognized as one of the regions with the
highest income inequality- has recently begun an upward social mobility process.
Estimates for the region suggest that within the 15 year period from 1995 to 2010,
the percentage of poor and vulnerable households decreased from 79.1% to 59.3%,
and the middle class population approximately doubled from 20.9% to 40.7%.
This upward trend in the middle class is not restricted to Latin America, other
developing countries have been experiencing it as well. See Dang and Lanjouw
(2015a), Dang and Lanjouw (2015b), Kharas (2010), Kharas (2017) and Kochhar
(2015).
This paper is an empirical study that examines the link between a rising
middle income class within a developing country and macroeconomic implications
in the short run. In particular, I focus on the effect of a larger middle class
on aggregate (consumption growth) volatility in emerging/developing countries.
Since developing countries have less developed financial systems than their
high-income counterparts, I examine the role of financial development in the
1
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relationship of interest.
Previous theoretical literature using closed economy models has explored
the relationship between inequality and volatility and suggests some answers.
However, an unambiguous answer can only be pinned down by unobserved
structural parameters like the degree of capital market imperfections or those
related to households preferences.
The paper by Aghion et al. (1999) introduces a closed economy model with
separation between savers and physical capital investors and an imperfect capital
market. They show that the degree of separation (inequality measure implied by
the model) may lead the economy to fluctuate around its steady state growth
path and that the degree of capital market imperfection (constraints on amount
investors can borrow from savers) plays a key role. In particular, the combination
of both a relatively high degree of physical separation and poor functioning capital
markets may yield higher aggregate volatility in the long run.
Ghiglino and Venditti (2007) derive conditions related to technology and
consumer’s preferences that lead to either a negative or positive impact of
wealth inequality on macroeconomic volatility. In their deterministic model
with complete markets and no borrowing constraints, wealth inequality (modeled
through heterogeneity in share of initial stock of capital and labor endowments)
may affect the economy through the stability properties of the steady state and
generate periodical solutions. The authors find that if absolute risk tolerance is a
strictly concave function, sufficiently low levels of wealth inequality may lead to
higher macroeconomic volatility.
Even though there exists a very large empirical literature studying the effect
of inequality on growth and development1, the empirical literature focusing on the
1The majority of empirical papers within the inequality-growth literature support the thesis
that inequality hinders growth. Several mechanisms have been explored and supported; for
example, inequality can undermine progress in health and education which are important growth
determinants (Easterly, 2001). See Easterly (2007) for a more extended survey.
2
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relationship between income distribution and growth volatility is meagre.
Breen and García-Peñalosa (2005) studied the effect of (long run) volatility on
inequality for a set of both developed and developing countries. Using a sample of
80 countries, the authors run OLS of the GINI coefficient in 1990 on the standard
deviation of annual rate of growth real per capita GDP over the period 1960 to
1990. The authors find a significant positive effect of volatility on inequality. This
result, however, is unsurprising since developing and emerging countries have the
highest income inequality indices and at the same time output growth in these
countries is much more volatile than in their developed counterparts. It is a
challenging task to disentangle the causal effect of volatility on inequality (or vice
versa) without using panel data methods to control for unobserved heterogeneity
and endogeneity.
Iyigun and Owen (2004) use a panel data of 27 countries to assess the impact
of income inequality on volatility of real consumption or output growth. Their
estimation strategy is a two and three period fixed effect model. They find
supporting evidence that a decline in inequality increases consumption growth
volatility in a sample that includes both developed and developing countries. Their
limited sample size prevents any analysis by income level classification and the
question of whether a particular set of countries may be driving their findings
remains unanswered.
A couple of seminal papers from the political economy literature study the
effect of inequality on long run growth. They suggest some mechanisms through
which inequality changes may affect aggregate volatility. Alesina and Perotti
(1996) argue that a lower middle class fuels social discontent increasing socio-
political instability, and ultimately reduces investment. Their cross sectional
regressions based on a sample of 71 countries for the period 1960-1985 provide
empirical support for this hypothesis. Rodrik (1999) argues that when there is
3
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an external shock, the policy response (e.g. devaluation and fiscal retrenchment)
would be much more difficult to implement in a country with potential for social
conflict because of the distributional implications of the policies. The author
provides evidence on the negative effect of inequality on long run growth, through
its effect on potential social conflict. The validity of income inequality as an
instrument of socio-political instability in both papers, suggests that a decline in
inequality is associated with a reduction in the number of potential social conflicts
and political instability. The question that is left unanswered in both papers, is
the effect of decreasing socio-political instability on aggregate volatility. Assuming
this type of instability is among the most important sources of growth volatility
in developing countries, it would predict a reduction on aggregate volatility.
Since the upward trend in income mobility in developing countries is still
relatively recent, there is not enough evidence that a rising middle class may
bring unambiguously lower social conflict and political instability within countries
still facing relatively high levels of inequality. Hirschman and Rothschild (1973)
suggest that the movement of others, when unaccompanied by one’s own, might
be welcomed at first but subsequently resented. This may indeed be the case with
developing countries, where even though the middle class has been increasing,
they still observe the highest income inequality levels. The political economy
mechanism is left for future research to explore.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effect of inequality and
middle class size on consumption volatility by focusing on developing countries.
Relative to Iyigun and Owen (2004), we improve the estimation strategy, increase
the sample size and divide the sample by income level classification. In addition,
we examine the role of financial development.
We find that the size of the middle class tends to have a positive effect on
consumption growth volatility in developing countries, particularly at low levels
4
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of financial development. For this sample of countries, financial development has
a significant role. Finally, we find that the effect of the size of the middle class and
the role of financial development on consumption volatility in developed countries
is ambiguous and not significantly different from zero.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the rising
middle class in developing countries as documented by previous papers. Section
3 explains the econometric methodology and describes the sample, middle class
and financial development measures. Section 4 presents estimation results and
answer our research question. Furthermore, we examine the role of financial depth.
Section 5 presents robustness checks and Section 6 concludes.
1.2 The rising middle income class in the
developing world
A report by the World Bank (Ferreira et al., 2013) found that Latin America
has been experiencing a dramatic increase in the middle class population in the last
15 years. The Report uses household surveys from 18 Latin American countries
for the period 1995-2010 and defines a middle class household as one with per
capita income between US$10 and US $50 a day- expressed in 2005 US$ PPP
(purchasing power parity). This is a region specific measure derived by Lopez-
Calva and Ortiz-Juarez (2011) which echoes the concept of economic security,
that is a “low probability” (10 percent) of falling back into poverty, when setting
the lower bound of income threshold. It has also been validated by self perception
surveys and respects a standard moderate poverty line in the region.
The derivation of transition matrices based on synthetic panels yielded
interesting findings across countries and allowed the construction of regional
measures. Out of every 100 latin americans, 43 changed their economic status
5
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during the period and out of these 43 “movers”, only 2 experienced a worsening of
their status. Their estimates for the region suggest that the percentage of middle
class households increased from 20.9% in 1995 to 40.7% in 2010 (Figure 1.1). In
addition, the percentage of poor households was approximately halved and reached
23.4% by the end of the same 15 year period (Figure 1.2). Out of 18 latin american
countries included in the analysis, five countries emerge as the main protagonists
of this social progress: Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia and Ecuador. Within
a 15 year period, these countries at least halved the poor population and around
50 to 60 % of the population moved upwards in the defined social scale.
Figure 1.1: The emerging middle class in Latin America
Source: World Bank (2013)
Notes: “Middle class”: individuals with a per capita income higher than US$10 per day expressed
in 2005 US$ PPP (purchasing power parity). Report based on household surveys from Socio-
Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC). Middle class measure for
the entire Latin America region use as weights country-specific population estimates of the last
available period. Years vary across countries. Years used are: Argentina 1994 and 2009; Bolivia
1992 and 2007; Brazil 1990 and 2009; Chile 1992 and 2009; Colombia 1992 and 2008; Costa
Rica 1989 and 2009; Dominican Republic 1996 and 2009; Ecuador 1995 and 2009; Guatemala
2000 and 2006; Honduras 1994 and 2009; Mexico 2000 and 2008; Nicaragua 1998 and 2005;
Panama 1994 and 2009; Peru 1999 and 2009; Paraguay 1999 and 2009; El Salvador 1991 and
2008; Uruguay 1989 and 2009; and Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela 1992 and 2006.
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Figure 1.2: Declining poverty headcount ratios at 4 US$ a day
Source: World Bank (2013)
Notes: Poverty lines and incomes are expressed in 2005 US$ PPP per day. Report based
on household surveys from Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean
(SEDLAC).
This upward trend in the percentage of middle class households is not restricted
to Latin America. Dang and Lanjouw (2015a) use the same methodology to
construct synthetic panels from cross sectional surveys and a similar vulnerability-
based definition for the middle class to document the rising middle class in India.
They find that the population share of the poor category decreased by 14% and
that of the middle class increased by 24% over the period 2004-2009. They also
find that during the subsequent period of 2009-2011, there was a faster shrinkage of
poor households (22%) and a faster growth of the middle class (28%). Repeating
the analysis for Vietnam, Dang and Lanjouw (2015b) find that the population
share of the poor category decreased by 29 % and that of the middle class increased
by 22% over the period 2004-2008.
Kharas (2010) aims to quantify and project the evolution of the global middle
class, by defining it as the percentage of households with per capita incomes
between $10 and $100 per person per day in 2005 PPP terms. The author projects
the size of the global middle class until 2020 and finds that “several asian countries,
in particular China and India, have reached a tipping point where large numbers
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of people will enter the middle class and drive (global) consumption”.
Since then, two developments have shaped global middle-class calculations.
First, a survey of purchasing power parity (PPP) prices conducted in 2011 has
replaced the previous 2005 PPP survey World Bank (2014) as the basis for
comparing real income levels across countries. Second, the addition of new
household surveys that allow, in some cases, direct measurement of the middle
class.
Kochhar (2015) takes into account these two developments and redefines middle
class households as those with per capita income within the range of $10 and $20
USD (PPP 2011). After compiling survey data from 111 countries for the years
2001 and 2011, the author documents that the global middle class doubled (+ 385
million people) within the decade examined but the rise was mostly concentrated
in few regions within the developing world. The increase in the global middle class
was mostly coming from China (53%), Latin America (16%) and Eastern europe
(10 %). Table 1.1 shows the estimated percentage of middle class households in
2001 and 2011 for selected countries.
Table 1.1: Middle class households as % total households in selected countries.
2001 2011
China 3% 18%
Belarus 21% 53%
Romania 6 % 25%
Ukraine 8% 49%
Bulgaria 28% 48%
Source: Kochhar (2015)
A more recent paper by Kharas (2017), calculates the size of the global middle
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class in order to contrast it with his earlier forecast (Kharas, 2010). His new
calculations suggest that there were approximately 3.2 billion people in the middle
class at the end of 2016; that is around 500 million more than his previous
estimates. Furthermore, the updated data is able to distinguish two groups. In
the developed countries of North America and Europe, the middle class is large
but growing slower than overall population growth. In fact, some households are
falling below the middle class threshold, while others are escaping and reaching
the so called rich status. The other group is the one corresponding to developing
countries where there is a dynamic and fast growing middle class. Even though
the middle class is growing everywhere in the developing world, Asia observes the
greatest numbers.
The rest of this paper examines whether a larger middle income class within
a developing country may bring some negative macroeconomic implications, in
particular higher aggregate volatility in consumption. In addition, we explore the
role of financial development. We begin by describing the empirical approach and
the data in the next section.
1.3 Empirical model and data description
1.3.1 A simple econometric model
Denote Mi,t to be a measure of the middle class size and FINDEVi,t a
measure of financial development for country i at time t. Consumption growth
variability, Vi,t, is defined as the standard deviation of quarterly growth rate of
real consumption per capita estimated for a 5 year period and starting at time t.
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The model assumed for the data generating process is as follows:
Vi,t =β1Qi,t + β2Mi,t + β3Mi,t × FINDEVi,t + i,t
i,t =µi + vi,t
E(µi) =E(vi,t) = E(µivi,t) = 0
(1.1)
Following previous literature on determinants of growth or growth volatility
(see Beck et al. (2000) and Bekaert et al. (2006) for a survey), variables included in
Qi,t control for different levels of consumption growth variability across countries.
These controls include initial income per capita, population growth rate, openness
to trade, the ratio of government spending and financial development. The
coefficients of interest are the effect of middle class size on consumption growth
volatility (β2) and the interaction effect between financial development and middle
class size (β3).
One immediate problem in applying pooled OLS to this empirical model is that
regressors are very likely to be correlated with fixed effects in the error term and
this violates an assumption needed for consistency. One way to purge fixed effects
is to use the LSDV estimator and draw them out of the error term by entering
dummies for each country but there is still the need to address potential endogenity
of regressors. 2SLS is not convenient since according to Roodman (2014), even
though consistent, is efficient under homoskedasticity. This assumption is rarely
valid when using panel data.
In fact, existing empirical research with similar models of average consumption
growth over non-overlapping periods, often rely on a dynamic panel estimation
strategy. This is due to several reasons. First, the data generating process
assumed in equation (1) assumes fixed individual effects which favors a panel setup
where the time dimension can prove to be useful to identify parameters. Second,
regressors are most likely endogenous or at least predetermined but not strictly
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exogenous. Third, idiosyncratic disturbances vi,t may have individual specific
patterns of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Fourth, after including
time effects and perhaps region dummies, the idiosyncratic disturbances are
uncorrelated across countries. Fifth, the panel is small T and relative large N.
All these reasons favor the use of difference and/or system GMM estimators.
The difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) allows to purge
fixed effects by transforming the regression model by first differencing.
∆Vi,t =β1∆Qi,t + β2∆Mi,t + β3∆ (Mi,t × FINDEVi,t) + ∆vi,t (1.2)
After transformation, the endogeneity issue still remains. Moreover, any
predetermined variable becomes potentially endogenous. To see this, assume Mi,t
is a predetermined but not strictly exogenous variable 2. The term Mi,t in ∆Mi,t
is correlated with the term vi,t−1 in ∆vi,t.
To address this endogeneity problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest to
instrument the lagged values of explanatory variables with their levels. Assuming
that there is no serial correlation in the error term v, valid instruments for the first
difference of predetermined variables (Xi,t) are the first and further lags of their
levels while for endogenous variables are the second and further lags of their levels.
The corresponding GMM estimator exploits the following moment conditions:
E [Xi,t−s · (∆vi,t)] = 0 ∀s ≥ 1 t = 2, . . . , T (1.3)
As Beck et al. (2000) and the references therein pointed out, there are several
conceptual and econometric problems with the difference GMM that lead their
empirical work on the relationship between growth and financial development be
2E(Mi,tvi,s) = 0 ∀t ≤ s is a reasonable assumption to make since one could argue that even
though future volatility may be related to current social indicators of inequality, unanticipated
changes (idiosyncratic disturbances) are unrelated.
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based on the system GMM approach. First, by first-differencing the researcher
neglects the pure cross country dimension of the data. This is a potential concern
in this study since ratios of between variation over within variation for different
measures of inequality range from 2.9 − 4.4 (see Descriptive statistics in Table
A.1 in Appendix). Second, differencing may decrease the signal-to noise ratio and
exacerbate measurement error biases. Finally, lagged levels are often rather poor
instruments for first differenced variables, especially if the variables are close to a
random walk.
Taking into account these conceptual and econometric shortcomings and
following Beck et al. (2000), the estimator chosen to answer the empirical question
is system GMM developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and outlined in Arellano
and Bover (1995). This approach instead of transforming regressors to deal with
fixed effects, transform instruments to make them exogenous to fixed effects.
Valid instruments for predetermined variables are their first difference at all lags
(including contemporaneous) while for endogenous variables are the first and
further lags of their first difference. For example, let regressorsX be predetermined
but not strictly exogenous, in addition to the moment conditions specified in
equation (3) this estimator uses the following moment conditions:
E [∆Xi,t−s · (µi + vi,t)] = 0 ∀s ≥ 0 t = 2, . . . , T (1.4)
Validity relies on the assumption that changes in instrumenting variablesX are
uncorrelated with fixed effects, equivalently E [Xi,t · µi] is time invariant. Moreover
and as in difference GMM, validity also depends on the assumption that v is not
serially correlated.
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1.3.2 Sample description
Since the focus of our research question is on emerging and developing
countries, the sample is restricted to low middle income and upper middle income
countries according to the World Bank’s income group classification3. In addition,
we add five countries typically considered emerging markets4 that on june 2015
(date of data download) were classified as high income: Russian Federation, Chile,
Poland, Trinidad y Tobago and Uruguay.
The panel considered for this study spans the years 1985 to 2014 and includes
an initial set of 67 developing and emerging countries: Azerbaijan, Bahamas, The,
Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Chile,
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep., El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia,
Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran Islamic Rep.,
Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Macedonia, Malaysia,
Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russian Federation,
Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza.
This set will be restricted by the availability of data on middle class size
indicators.
3Country selection is based on data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
database accessed on june 2015
4Both Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and J.P. Morgan Securities Inc.
consider these countries in their corresponding emerging markets indexes widely used by financial
investors. In particular and as example, the Emerging Markets Research group from J.P.
Morgan Securities Inc. includes them in their emerging markets debt benchmark known as
EMBI Global (Emerging Markets Bond Index Global). The criteria to establish the universe of
eligible countries to be included in the EMBI Global are two and are described in Cavanagh and
Long (1999)
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1.3.3 Measuring the middle class
Ferreira et al. (2013) argue that defining the middle class is not a trivial matter
and the choices depend on the perspective of the researcher. In sociology and
political science, the middle class is often defined in terms of education, occupation
or asset ownership. In economics, by contrast, the definition is often focused
on income levels. Within this field, the authors distinguish two common types
of definitions: the relative income based and the absolute income based. The
former classifies the middle class as households with income falling in between a
pre-specified range of ranks or positions in the income distribution. The latter
identifies the middle class as those households with income in a specific range
of standardized international dollars (that is, at purchasing power parity [PPP]
exchange rates).
As pointed out in their paper, there is currently no dataset that reports
absolute measures of the middle class and that also has large enough cross-
sections and long-enough time series. Moreover, the absolute measure faces the
fundamental question on how to define such absolute level.
This study will use the relative income based definition following Barro (2000)
and Easterly (2001). According to their definition, a middle class household has
income falling within the three middle quintiles of income distribution. Due to the
lack of immediate data on the percentage of total households classified as middle
class under this criteria, middle class size is approximated by the share of income
held by the middle quintiles of income distribution. Two measures of inequality
will also be considered. In total, four variables are used to proxy for middle class
size within country i at time t (Mi,t in equation 1):
1. The share of income held by the second, third and fourth quintiles of income
distribution (SH234)
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2. The share of income held by second and third quintiles of income distribution
(SH23)
3. The Gini index (GINI): This index measures the area between the Lorenz
curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage
of the maximum area under the line. Thus, a Gini index of 0 represents
perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.
4. The share of income held by the fifth quintile over the share held by the
third quintile (SH5TO3).
In the following figures, the time evolution of these indicators are displayed for
21 selected countries during the sample period. The figures plot the rolling five-
year averages of SH234, SH23, GINI and SH5TO3. In general, and in particular
for latin american countries, there is an apparent downward trend of the Gini
index and SH5TO3 and an upward trend of SH23 and SH234.
Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix show the mean of all middle class
size indicators during the period 2000-2009 and their change relative to the
previous decade, by country. Twenty one countries experienced a change in GINI,
SH23 and SH5TO3 consistent with an “emerging middle”. Eight out of the 21
countries are from Latin America (Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay). Kyrgyz Republic, Russian Federation,
Namibia, Malaysia, Iran and Azerbaijan also stand out as countries in which
inequality indicators declined substantially.
Middle class size measures and all variables considered as controls in our
regression are downloaded fromWorld BankWorld Development Indicators (WDI)
database.
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Figure 1.3: Evolution of share of income held by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quintiles of
income distribution (SH234) in selected countries (rolling 5 year mean)
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development (GFD) database.
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Figure 1.4: Evolution of share of income held by the 2nd and 3rd quintiles of
income distribution (SH23) in selected countries (rolling 5 year mean)
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development (GFD) database.
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Figure 1.5: Evolution of the GINI index in selected countries (rolling 5 year mean)
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development (GFD) database.
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Figure 1.6: Evolution of share of income held by 5th quintile relative to 3rd quintile
(SH5TO3) in selected countries (rolling 5 year mean)
Source: World Bank Global Financial Development (GFD) database.
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1.3.4 Measuring financial development
According to Levine (2005), “financial development occurs when financial
instruments, markets, and intermediaries ameliorate - though do not necessarily
eliminate - the effects of information, enforcement, and transactions costs and
therefore do a correspondingly better job at providing the five financial functions”.
These five functions are: (i) production of ex-ante information about possible
investments, (ii) monitoring of investments and implementation of corporate
governance, (iii) trading, diversification, and management of risk, (iv) mobilization
and pooling of savings, and (v) exchange of goods and services.
Since obtaining such direct measures of these financial functions is a major
challenge, Cihak et al. (2012) describe indicators that could be used to measure
four important characteristics of financial systems. These characteristics are
proxies of the services provided by the financial system:
1. Size of financial institutions and markets (depth).
2. Degree to which individuals and firms can and do use financial institutions
and markets (access).
3. The efficiency of financial institutions and markets in providing financial
services (efficiency).
4. Stability of financial institutions and markets (stability).
After clustering countries by income level, the authors provide summary
statistics of winsorized and rescaled variables (0-100) for each characteristic.
The authors find that the largest difference between the financial system of
middle income countries (both lower and upper) and high income is on its depth.
While financial systems in developing countries tend to be much less deep and
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also somewhat less efficient and providing less access, their stability has been
comparable to developed.
Due to this finding and also to the lack of long enough series for the suggested
variables that approximate access or efficiency, this study will focus on measures
of depth, a proxy of the overall extent of services provided by the financial system.
Therefore, following Cihak et al. (2012), the variables considered will be: domestic
credit to private sector as % of GDP (PRIVY), liquid liabilities to GDP (LIQY),
bank deposits to GDP (BANKDY), financial system deposits to GDP (FINDY)
and money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP. M2 is a measure of the money
supply that includes cash, checking, and saving accounts.
Data is downloaded from World Bank’s Global Financial Development.
database launched in 2012.
1.4 Estimation results
This section presents the results of estimating the model with predetermined
regressors using system GMM and up to two lags when building internal
instruments. Joint validity of instruments is tested using the Hansen J test of
over identifying restrictions. Validity of instruments depends on error terms not
serially correlated, so we perform the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation.
The model includes time effects to remove universal time related shocks from
errors. After controlling for time effects, standard errors are assumed to be
uncorrelated across countries and heteroskedastic within countries. Two step
results are presented with the Windmeijer small sample correction which according
to Roodman (2014) reduces the problem of downward bias and removes the need
to present first step estimates. All regressions include the typical controls used in
growth and volatility regressions mentioned earlier.
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Table 1.2 presents results when middle class size is measured by share of income
held by second, third and fourth of income distribution (SH234) and considering
all five proxies of financial development (more precisely, depth of the financial
system). All coefficients of SH234 -our first main interest- are positive and four
out of five are significant at the 5% level. The interaction term between SH234
and financial development -our second main interest- is negative across all proxies
of financial development and four out of five are significant. Interestingly, the
sign of financial development is positive across all proxies and three out of five are
significant at least at the 10% level.
Same findings, yet even more significant, appear when middle class size is
measured by share of income held by second and third of income distribution
(SH23). These estimates are presented in Table 1.3.
Table 1.4 presents results when the middle class size is proxied by the Gini
index. In all five cases, the Gini index is negatively associated with consumption
growth volatility. That is, an increase in the middle class size (a decrease in the
Gini index) increases consumption growth volatility. While the sign of financial
development proxy is consistently negative in all cases, it is significant in four out
of five. The interaction term is positive across all proxies of financial development
and three out of five are significant at least at the 10% level.
Table 1.5 displays similar results when measuring middle class size by share
of income held by fifth quintile over the share of income held by third quintile
of income distribution (SH5TO3). All coefficients of SH5TO3 are negative and
three out of five are significant at the 5% level. The sign of financial development
is again negative across all proxies and three out of five are significant at least
at the 5% level. Finally, and similar to the GINI specification, the interaction
term is positive across all proxies of financial development and three out of five
are significant.
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Overall, regardless of the middle class size measure, our findings suggest that
the marginal effect of middle class size on consumption growth volatility is positive
for low levels of financial development and turns negative at higher levels of
financial development. Figure 1.7 illustrates the conditional marginal effect of
each middle class size indicator using FINDY as proxy of financial development
and taking all controls at their means. This proxy is chosen for illustration since
it is significant through both its level and interaction term regardless the middle
class size measure considered. See Appendix (figures A.1 - A.4) for conditional
marginal effects based on other proxies.
Regarding the concern about validity of instruments, we can’t reject the null
hypothesis of validity of over-identifying restrictions. The p-values of the Hansen
J-test range from 0.301 to 0.910 and sixteen out of a total of twenty models5 report
p-values between 0.4 and 0.9. There is also no evidence for significant second order
autocorrelation. The p-values of the test of second order autocorrelation range
from 0.197 to 0.831. To sum up, these test statistics hint at a proper specification.
Regarding the significance of growth regression type of controls, only six out of
twenty models could report 10 % statistical significance for initial GDP per capita
(lgdppc). Also, only in two cases we find the coefficient of annual population
growth rate significant and positive. This is consistent with the findings of Bekaert
et al. (2006).
5Four middle class size measures and five financial depth proxies make a total of twenty
specifications or “models”
23
Chapter 1. Inequality and volatility in developing countries
Table 1.2: SH234 and consumption growth volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PRIVY M2 BANKDY FINDY LIQY
lgdppc 2.506 2.891 3.869* 3.752* 1.888
[2.807] [3.457] [2.240] [2.196] [2.636]
pop 3.571* 2.069 0.304 0.345 -0.0697
[1.796] [1.986] [2.147] [2.117] [1.890]
trade 1.567 2.780 2.078 2.030 2.065
[2.034] [2.071] [1.860] [1.879] [1.966]
gov -0.175 -2.109 -1.369 -1.609 -0.543
[2.364] [2.796] [2.808] [2.851] [2.269]
SH234 0.900*** 1.012*** 0.863** 0.879** 0.741
[0.294] [0.365] [0.380] [0.363] [0.450]
FINDEV 0.321** 0.660** 0.664 0.677* 0.476
[0.131] [0.324] [0.398] [0.397] [0.491]
SH234xFINDEV -0.00735** -0.0144** -0.0153* -0.0155* -0.0111
[0.00282] [0.00670] [0.00839] [0.00832] [0.0101]
Hansen statistic 9.150 11.77 8.507 8.241 10.06
Hansen d.f. 14 14 14 14 14
p-value of Hansen 0.821 0.625 0.861 0.876 0.758
AR(2) test statistic 0.691 -0.939 -0.628 -0.720 -0.573
p-value of AR(2) 0.489 0.348 0.530 0.472 0.567
Number of instruments 26 26 26 26 26
Countries 51 52 51 51 51
N 190 193 187 187 187
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Financial
Development (GFD) databases.
Notes: The table displays two step system GMM results with the Windmeijer small
sample correction and including time effects. Base sample is an unbalanced panel of
middle income countries spanning from 1985-2010 with data at five-year intervals, where
the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable. The dependent variable is
the real per capita consumption growth volatility. SH234 is the 5-year arithmetic mean
of share of income held by second, third and fourth quintile of income distribution.
FINDEV relates to the 5 year mean of the proxy chosen for financial development
and displayed in each column. PRIVY is domestic credit to private sector as % of
GDP, M2 is money and quasi money as % of GDP, BANKDY is bank deposits to
GDP, FINDY is financial system deposits to GDP and LIQY is liquid liabilities to
GDP (broad money). Controls are also expressed as 5 year mean and include: log
of GDP per capita at constant 2005 US$ (lgdppc), population annual growth rate in
percentage points (pop), sum of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP
in logs (trade) and general government final consumption expenditure to GDP in logs
(gov). Regressions use robust standard errors and treat all regressors as predetermined
but not strictly exogenous variables. Instrument matrix considers up to two lags and is
collapsed by the estimation. The row for the Hansen J-test reports the p-values for the
null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for AR(2) are the p-values
for second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
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Table 1.3: SH23 and consumption growth volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PRIVY M2 BANKDY FINDY LIQY
lgdppc 1.734 2.271 3.996* 3.977* 2.251
[2.646] [3.072] [2.011] [1.991] [2.132]
pop 3.338* 2.176 0.675 0.702 0.262
[1.973] [2.333] [2.138] [2.094] [1.891]
trade 0.796 1.996 2.011 2.014 1.949
[1.895] [1.815] [1.677] [1.698] [1.949]
gov 0.145 -1.491 -1.181 -1.394 0.0623
[2.428] [2.684] [2.430] [2.434] [2.189]
SH23 1.108*** 1.239** 1.058** 1.077*** 0.961*
[0.392] [0.485] [0.417] [0.399] [0.516]
FINDEV 0.226** 0.422* 0.434* 0.442* 0.355
[0.0993] [0.219] [0.231] [0.229] [0.307]
SH23xFINDEV -0.0101** -0.0175** -0.0189** -0.0192** -0.0155
[0.00392] [0.00834] [0.00869] [0.00851] [0.0114]
Hansen statistic 10.66 12.41 7.858 7.578 10.83
Hansen d.f. 14 14 14 14 14
p-value of Hansen 0.713 0.573 0.897 0.910 0.699
AR(2) test statistic 0.550 -0.734 -0.534 -0.607 -0.571
p-value of AR(2) 0.582 0.463 0.593 0.544 0.568
Number of instruments 26 26 26 26 26
Countries 51 52 51 51 51
N 190 193 187 187 187
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Financial
Development (GFD) databases.
Notes: The table displays two step system GMM results with the Windmeijer small
sample correction and including time effects. Base sample is an unbalanced panel
of middle income countries spanning from 1985-2010 with data at five-year intervals,
where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable. The dependent
variable is the real per capita consumption growth volatility. SH23 is the 5-year
arithmetic mean of share of income held by second and third quintile of income
distribution. FINDEV relates to the 5 year mean of the proxy chosen for financial
development and displayed in each column. PRIVY is domestic credit to private sector
as % of GDP, M2 is money and quasi money as % of GDP, BANKDY is bank deposits
to GDP, FINDY is financial system deposits to GDP and LIQY is liquid liabilities to
GDP (broad money). Controls are also expressed as 5 year mean and include: log
of GDP per capita at constant 2005 US$ (lgdppc), population annual growth rate in
percentage points (pop), sum of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP
in logs (trade) and general government final consumption expenditure to GDP in logs
(gov). Regressions use robust standard errors and treat all regressors as predetermined
but not strictly exogenous variables. Instrument matrix considers up to two lags and is
collapsed by the estimation. The row for the Hansen J-test reports the p-values for the
null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for AR(2) are the p-values
for second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
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Table 1.4: GINI and consumption growth volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PRIVY M2 BANKDY FINDY LIQY
lgdppc 2.930 1.424 4.882* 5.151* -0.804
[3.015] [4.524] [2.668] [2.669] [4.759]
pop 1.279 0.579 0.736 0.860 -0.676
[1.440] [2.141] [2.186] [2.088] [1.667]
trade 0.0927 0.978 3.274 3.296 0.733
[2.269] [2.350] [2.882] [2.885] [3.117]
gov 1.284 -0.649 -2.347 -2.225 -1.647
[3.823] [2.955] [1.997] [1.952] [2.741]
GINI -0.344* -0.375** -0.398*** -0.399*** -0.387***
[0.171] [0.174] [0.134] [0.129] [0.134]
FINDEV -0.121 -0.215* -0.389*** -0.383*** -0.324**
[0.171] [0.121] [0.122] [0.116] [0.131]
GINIxFINDEV 0.00251 0.00457 0.00899*** 0.00881*** 0.00641*
[0.00388] [0.00285] [0.00300] [0.00292] [0.00359]
Hansen statistic 14.39 16.21 10.07 9.975 12.52
Hansen d.f. 14 14 14 14 14
p-value of Hansen 0.421 0.301 0.757 0.764 0.565
AR(2) test statistic 1.074 0.214 -0.562 -0.497 -1.290
p-value of AR(2) 0.283 0.831 0.574 0.619 0.197
Number of instruments 26 26 26 26 26
Countries 51 52 51 51 51
N 189 192 186 186 186
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Financial
Development (GFD) databases.
Notes: The table displays two step system GMM results with the Windmeijer small
sample correction and including time effects. Base sample is an unbalanced panel of
middle income countries spanning from 1985-2010 with data at five-year intervals, where
the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable. The dependent variable is
the real per capita consumption growth volatility. GINI is the arithmetic mean of the
Gini index over a 5 year period. FINDEV relates to the 5 year mean of the proxy chosen
for financial development and displayed in each column. PRIVY is domestic credit to
private sector as % of GDP, M2 is money and quasi money as % of GDP, BANKDY is
bank deposits to GDP, FINDY is financial system deposits to GDP and LIQY is liquid
liabilities to GDP (broad money). Controls are also expressed as 5 year mean and include:
log of GDP per capita at constant 2005 US$ (lgdppc), population annual growth rate in
percentage points (pop), sum of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP
in logs (trade) and general government final consumption expenditure to GDP in logs
(gov). Regressions use robust standard errors and treat all regressors as predetermined
but not strictly exogenous variables. Instrument matrix considers up to two lags and is
collapsed by the estimation. The row for the Hansen J-test reports the p-values for the
null hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for AR(2) are the p-values for
second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
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Table 1.5: SH5TO3 and consumption growth volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PRIVY M2 BANKDY FINDY LIQY
lgdppc 1.815 -0.212 5.218 5.651 -0.835
[4.574] [5.255] [3.354] [3.411] [4.757]
pop 1.647 1.315 0.607 0.739 0.0114
[1.781] [2.528] [3.145] [3.057] [2.136]
trade 3.863 2.257 3.971 4.033 1.823
[3.451] [3.757] [3.338] [3.382] [3.537]
gov -1.396 -2.260 -3.039 -2.911 -3.271
[2.616] [2.863] [2.603] [2.622] [3.034]
SH5TO3 -1.682 -1.352 -3.424** -3.484** -3.256**
[1.215] [1.273] [1.704] [1.694] [1.513]
FINDEV -0.0832 -0.0751 -0.258** -0.257*** -0.265***
[0.0730] [0.0713] [0.0973] [0.0925] [0.0844]
SH5TO3xFINDEV 0.0139 0.00925 0.0703** 0.0695** 0.0630*
[0.0161] [0.0194] [0.0278] [0.0270] [0.0320]
Hansen statistic 15.26 16.07 12.61 12.34 13.84
Hansen d.f. 14 14 14 14 14
p-value of Hansen 0.360 0.309 0.557 0.579 0.462
AR(2) test statistic 1.066 0.908 -0.542 -0.463 -1.541
p-value of AR(2) 0.286 0.364 0.588 0.643 0.123
Number of instruments 26 26 26 26 26
Countries 51 52 51 51 51
N 190 193 187 187 187
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Financial
Development (GFD) databases.
Notes: The table displays two step system GMM results with the Windmeijer
small sample correction and including time effects. Base sample is an unbalanced
panel of middle income countries spanning from 1985-2010 with data at five-year
intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable. The
dependent variable is the real per capita consumption growth volatility. SH5TO3
is the 5-year arithmetic mean of share of income held by fifth over share of income
held by third quintile of income distribution. FINDEV relates to the 5 year mean of
the proxy chosen for financial development and displayed in each column. PRIVY
is domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP, M2 is money and quasi money
as % of GDP, BANKDY is bank deposits to GDP, FINDY is financial system
deposits to GDP and LIQY is liquid liabilities to GDP (broad money). Controls
are also expressed as 5 year mean and include: log of GDP per capita at constant
2005 US$ (lgdppc), population annual growth rate in percentage points (pop), sum
of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP in logs (trade) and general
government final consumption expenditure to GDP in logs (gov). Regressions use
robust standard errors and treat all regressors as predetermined but not strictly
exogenous variables. Instrument matrix considers up to two lags and is collapsed
by the estimation. The row for the Hansen J-test reports the p-values for the null
hypothesis of instrument validity. The values reported for AR(2) are the p-values for
second order autocorrelated disturbances in the first differences equations.
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Figure 1.7: Marginal effects of inequality indicators conditional to FINDY as proxy
for financial development
(a) SH234 (b) SH23
(c) GINI (d) SH5TO3
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Financial Development
(GFD) databases.
Notes: The proxy for financial development in this graph is Financial system deposits over GDP
(FINDY). GINI is the World Bank estimate of the Gini index in the scale of 0 to 100. SH5TO3 is
income share held by fifth quintile over income share held by third quintile of income distribution.
SH234 is income share held by second,third and fourth quintile of income distribution. SH23
is income share held by second and third quintile of income distribution. Controls included in
the regression model are evaluated at means and shaded area is 90 % confidence interval. Each
subfigure represents the effect of an unit increase on the correspondent inequality indicator on
the standard deviation of real consumption per capita annual growth over a 5 year period. For
example: an increase of one point in the GINI index (say from 50 to 51) is associated with a larger
decline in volatility at lower levels of FINDY. As FINDY increases this marginal effect becomes
less negative. At levels above the 50% a marginal increase in the GINI index is associated with
an increase in volatility.
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1.4.1 Taking the estimation to a sample of developed
countries
For the purpose of comparing whether results hold for high income countries,
we perform the same analysis with a sample of developed countries and consider
an initial list of 31 high-income countries according to data from the World
Bank in 2015: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad y Tobago, United
Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.
The model is first estimated following the benchmark specification, that is
with predetermined regressors using system GMM and up to two lags when
building internal instruments. It also includes time effects, and two step results are
presented with Windmeijer small sample correction. The p-values of the Hansen
J-test and those of the second order autocorrelation have values ranging as in
the benchmark specification so we can’t reject the null hypothesis of validity of
over-identifying restrictions and there is no evidence for significant second order
autocorrelation.
Estimation results indicate that when switching the analysis to a high-income
sample of countries, there is no evidence that middle class size affects volatility
since all the twenty models display insignificant estimates and mixed signs. Table
1.6 displays results using SH234 as middle class size measure6.
6Regression results using other middle class size indicators are available upon request.
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Table 1.6: SH234 and consumption growth volatility in high-income countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PRIVY M2 BANKDY FINDY LIQY
lgdppc -2.886** -2.428* -2.522** -3.110* -3.154
[1.350] [1.276] [1.200] [1.818] [2.616]
pop 0.689 0.733 0.534 0.621 1.215
[1.648] [1.596] [1.450] [2.106] [1.485]
trade 0.558 -0.566 1.868 -0.468 1.113
[3.060] [2.745] [2.816] [5.413] [4.762]
gov -4.108 -5.848 -0.307 -6.593 2.532
[6.934] [5.493] [7.587] [12.77] [13.11]
SH234 0.115 0.108 0.314 -0.00862 0.143
[0.327] [0.305] [0.435] [0.716] [0.568]
FINDEV 0.242 0.130 0.137 -0.487 0.101
[0.314] [0.463] [0.745] [0.969] [0.826]
SH234xFINDEV -0.00402 -0.00208 -0.00293 0.00879 -0.00254
[0.00570] [0.00898] [0.0139] [0.0181] [0.0163]
Hansen statistic 8.011 10.49 11.31 9.539 11.39
Hansen d.f. 14 14 14 14 14
p-value of Hansen 0.889 0.725 0.661 0.795 0.655
AR(2) test statistic 0.961 0.911 0.691 0.952 0.826
p-value of AR(2) 0.336 0.362 0.490 0.341 0.409
Number of instruments 26 26 26 26 26
Countries 31 31 29 29 28
N 113 98 105 107 104
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Financial
Development (GFD) databases.
Notes: The table displays two step system GMM results with the Windmeijer small
sample correction and including time effects. Base sample is an unbalanced panel
of high income countries spanning from 1985-2010 with data at five-year intervals,
where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable. The dependent
variable is the real per capita consumption growth volatility. SH234 is the 5-year
arithmetic mean of share of income held by second, third and fourth quintile of
income distribution. FINDEV relates to the 5 year mean of the proxy chosen for
financial development and displayed in each column. PRIVY is domestic credit to
private sector as % of GDP, M2 is money and quasi money as % of GDP, BANKDY
is bank deposits to GDP, FINDY is financial system deposits to GDP and LIQY
is liquid liabilities to GDP (broad money). Controls are also expressed as 5 year
mean and include: log of GDP per capita at constant 2005 US$ (lgdppc), population
annual growth rate in percentage points (pop), sum of exports and imports of goods
and services to GDP in logs (trade) and general government final consumption
expenditure to GDP in logs (gov). Regressions use robust standard errors and treat
all regressors as predetermined but not strictly exogenous variables. Instrument
matrix considers up to two lags and is collapsed by the estimation. The row for the
Hansen J-test reports the p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity.
The values reported for AR(2) are the p-values for second order autocorrelated
disturbances in the first differences equations.
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1.5 Some robustness checks
1.5.1 Controlling for region dummies
Since business cycles are likely to be correlated across geographical regions,
this section checks robustness of previous findings when in addition to time effects
and country fixed effects, region fixed affects are also considered. Countries of the
sample are distributed across six regions: East Asia and Pacific (7) , Europe and
Central Asia (15), Latin America and Caribbean (23), Middle East and North
Africa (9), South Asia (2) and Sub-Saharan Africa (6).
Adding either a latin american dummy or the full set of regional dummies
in the regression, does not change the results significantly. In the model using
SH234 as the middle class size indicator, all coefficients of SH234 are significantly
positive. Regressions with the latin american dummy are presented in Appendix
(tables A.8 - A.11). This robustness check shows that results are not driven by
Latin American countries or other regions.
1.5.2 Using non-overlapping 4 year and 6 year periods
When estimating the model using non-overlapping 6 year periods, the
instrument matrix is extended to include 3 lags due to the result that for many
of the twenty models, the 2 lags specification no longer pass the hansen test ( p-
values are less or around 0.1). When 3 lags are used to instrument predetermined
variables in the model, models that use GINI and SH5TO3 not only prove to
be robust and consistent with earlier findings but also PRIVY and M2 are now
significant through both their levels and the interaction terms at least at the 10%.
In the cases of SH234 and SH23, coefficients of the inequality proxy remain positive
and overall significant at least at the 10% level. While signs of all interaction
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terms remain consistent with earlier findings, only the one including M2 remains
significant at the 10%.
When estimating the model using non overlapping 4 year periods and using two
lags as instrument, results overall are consistent with earlier findings; especially
when middle class size is proxied by GINI or SH5TO3. In the cases of SH234
and SH23, results prove to be a bit weaker since only a few coefficients of the
middle class size proxy or its interaction with financial development retain their
significance at 10%7
1.5.3 Restricting the sample to latin american countries
While the original dataset includes 23 latin american countries, data limitation
of social indicators sets the maximum sample size of the restricted sample to 20
countries (dropping The Bahamas, Cuba and Puerto Rico). The remaining list
of latin american countries includes: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago,
Uruguay and Venezuela.
When restricting the sample, descriptive statistics (see table A.2 in Appendix)
suggest an important loss of overall variation on both middle class size and financial
depth measures. Losses of overall variation for the list of financial development
proxies when restricting the sample are much greater than those observed for
measures of middle class size measures8. Much of the loss of overall variation
comes through between variation. One way to see this is by calculating the new
ratios of between variation over within. Regarding social indicators, while ratios
7Regression results are available upon request.
8Overall standard deviation of GINI, SH5to3, SH234 and SH23 are 0.7 to 5.25 lower relative
to those observed for the unrestricted sample. Overall standard deviation of financial depth
measures are 7.5 to 12 lower relative to those observed for the unrestricted sample.
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range from 2.9 to 4.4 in the unrestricted sample, ratios are now in the 2.3 -2.7
range. Regarding financial development proxies, while ratios were in between 2.3
- 2.6 for the unrestricted sample, now the range is 1.9-2.
Table A.2 in appendix presents a snapshot of the distribution of means for
each variable proxying inequality during the entire period 1985-2010 and for the
unrestricted sample. This table shows that latin american countries have the
lowest levels of middle class size (or highest inequality levels), regardless of the
measure chosen. More than half of the latin american sample have Gini index or
SH5to3 above the 75th percentile of its corresponding sample distribution. Ten out
of 23 countries have SH234 and SH23 below the 25th percentile of its corresponding
sample distribution (while 19 countries have it below the 50th percentile). Similar
analyses for financial development measures also suggest that on average, latin
american countries also have lower financial development regardless of the proxy
selected.
Not only will the total number of observations be more than halved when
restricting the sample to the latin american region, identification is expected to be
much more challenging since a large fraction of between variation is lost. Despite
this prediction, I describe estimation results9.
The model is first estimated following the benchmark specification; i.e with
predetermined regressors and using system GMM and up to two lags when building
internal instruments. As the benchmark specification, it includes time effects
and two step results are presented with Windmeijer small sample correction. In
addition, variables are averaged over 5 year periods (non-overlapping) and the
analysis is fixed to the period 1985-2010. As before, twenty models are considered
since we use 4 different measures of middle class size and 5 measures of financial
development.
9Regression results are available upon request.
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Three out of twenty models contradict previous findings. Specifications GINI-
M2, GINI-PRIVY and SH234-M2 seem to support the opposite hypothesis that
a larger middle class is associated with subsequent lower consumption growth
volatility and an increase in financial development attenuates this relationship and
potentially reverses it. The remaining seventeen models have mixed signs and no
significant estimates.
One thing that all these twenty specifications have in common is that joint
validity of instruments arises as potential concern and results should be taken
carefully since the p-value of hansen is high. Therefore, the model is re-estimated
by restricting the instrument set to one lag and this reduces p-value of Hansen
test to the range found in the benchmark specifications. This second round of
estimations find that two out of twenty models still challenge our earlier finding
for the unrestricted sample (i.e Sh5to3-M2 and SH234-M2).
Having described estimation results for the latin american case that deliver
contradicting results, it is worth noting that only M2 - although not robustly
across measures of income inequality - supports the alternate hypothesis that a
larger middle class amid higher financial development may increase subsequent
consumption growth volatility. Since no other financial development proxy
supports this - perhaps due to a bigger identification problem after a significant
loss in overall variation when restricting the sample -, results are only suggestive.
According to Cihak et al. (2012), the ratio of M2 to GDP captures the degree of
monetization in the system (proxy for financial depth), but does not capture the
degree of bank intermediation. Also, it doesn’t capture the broad access to bank
finance by individuals and firms, the quality of bank services and the efficiency of
providing banking services. The M2 variable could be well capturing other effects
so results should be taken carefully.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper examines empirically the link between a rising middle income class
within a developing country and macroeconomic implications in the short run. In
particular, I focus on the effect of a larger middle class on aggregate (consumption
growth) volatility in emerging/developing countries. Since developing countries
have less developed financial systems than their high-income counterparts, I
examine the role of financial development in the relationship of interest.
Using a sample of middle income countries, this paper provides empirical
evidence that a larger middle class size tends to increase aggregate consumption
growth volatility, particularly at low levels of financial system depth. Financial
development plays a significant role on determining the sign of the marginal effect
of middle class size on aggregate volatility. As more households escape poverty
thresholds and reach the middle income class status, the need to deepen financial
systems in developing and emerging countries becomes more important from the
perspective of aggregate consumption volatility.
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Chapter 2
Rising middle class and vendor financing incentives
in unsecured credit markets in Latin America
2.1 Introduction
The period of rise in the middle class population in Latin America, described
in Chapter 1, was also a period of increasing consumer credit. In particular, in
countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Chile and Brazil, international and national-
level retail chains emerged as the main credit suppliers of the lower-middle income
population (Obermann (2006), Ruiz-Tagle et al. (2013) and Montero and Tarzijan
(2010)).
According to Casanova and Renck (2015), in spite of a significant decline in
unemployment in recent years, the lack of formal employment and poor credit
history were still impeding many individuals from gaining access to consumer
finance from traditional financial institutions. In order to allow “new middle class
shoppers” access non-essential items typically offered by large retail stores, the
retailers themselves started offering credit.
Motivated by the emergence of vendors as consumption credit suppliers in these
Latin American countries, I set up a theoretical model of vendor financing in the
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unsecured credit market. The model illustrates the fundamentals affecting vendor
financing incentives that could increase credit supply on its extensive margin.
There are two strands of literature which we build on and contribute to.
The first strand is the study of consumption credit and default. Much of
this literature focuses on explaining stylized facts of the US credit market related
to the evolution of bankruptcy filing and consumption credit. There is indeed
active research trying to explain why the personal bankruptcy rate in the US has
increased more than threefold in the last two decades. Since there is an increasing
consensus that the rise in bankruptcies is primarily driven by consumer debt
market developments particularly related to IT progress, most of this literature
is gravitating towards the study of this link. Another theme in this literature
is what Livshits et al. (2016) call democratization of credit and what Drozd and
Serrano-Padial (2016) call revolving revolution, i.e., the extension of credit to new
and seemingly riskier borrowers in the recent decades. This rise in credit on the
extensive margin is driven by financial innovations in the former work and IT
adoption by the debt collection industry in the latter work. It may also arise
naturally in different models1. We extend the literature on unsecured credit by
including an alternative type of lender -vendors- whose business model differs from
that of banks. This exercise is highly relevant given that vendors are an important
source of consumption credit in developing countries2.
The second strand is the research related to trade finance. One of the earliest
papers with a stylized model of vendor financing incentives is by Brennan et al.
(1988). Their model suggests that one reason why retailers find profitable to
extend credit is that customers differ in their price elasticity and vendor financing is
a channel enabling them to price discriminate and increase overall sales. However,
1See Livshits (2015) for a review of papers in this literature.
2Livshits (2015) argued that one key challenge that he doesn’t think has been successfully
addressed yet is modelling a consumer credit market where borrowers may deal with multiple
lenders
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the type of credit is secured - the good purchased using credit is also used as
the collateral. Not surprisingly, subsequent papers both on the empirical and
theoretical front, evolved towards studying inter-firm credit. To my knowledge,
there is no theoretical work studying manufacturer incentives to provide unsecured
credit to the final good consumer. This research aims to be a first step to fill that
gap.
In this paper, we present a stylized model of vendor financing in an unsecured
credit market, following the intuition by Brennan et al. (1988). Vendors face
two types of customers - those who have unlimited access to credit and are
able to buy their good using cash or bank credit (cash customers), and those
financially constrained with low cash in hand that need credit to purchase the
good (credit customers). We study potential reasons triggering an increase in the
credit supplied by the non traditional financial sector, i.e vendors, at the extensive
margin. We particularly focus on the effect of a reduction in the average risk of
default and the market size of credit customers on vendor financing incentives. In
addition, we also examine the effect of certain structural parameters in the model
- one reflecting financial development and the other capturing bankruptcy costs.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the development of
commercial stores as non traditional consumption credit suppliers in Chile. Section
3 outlines the theoretical model of vendor financing in the unsecured credit market.
Section 4 presents the analytical results of the vendor’s optimization problem with
and without vendor financing. Section 5 enumerates cases depending on structural
parameters of the model and the corresponding vendor financing gains function.
Section 6 derives the core results of the paper through comparative statics
exercises. Section 7 provides empirical evidence supporting the model’s main
mechanism and an important model implication. We conclude by summarizing
our findings.
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2.2 Understanding the rise of vendor financing
using Chile as case study
Using the Chilean case as a research motivation is sensible given that it was
Chile where the vendor financing business model flourished, and later expanded
regionally. Even though Brazilian retailers pioneered the offer of installment
payment plans, Chilean retailers provide the earliest and most successful stories
of offering store cards (Calderón Hoffmann, 2006). Once the Chilean market
came close to saturation, Chilean retail conglomerates expanded to other Latin
American countries through acquisitions of local chains or local operations of
multinational retailers3.
We start by looking at aggregate measures of credit market depth in Chile.
According to a report by the SBIF (2015), debt to income ratio (DIR) experienced
a significant increase in the last two decades, jumping from 35% in 2001 to 61%
in 2015. Similarly, domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP increased from
45.3% in 1990 to 110.9% in 2015 and observed a clear upward trend during the
selected period as seen in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Domestic credit to private sector in Chile (% GDP)
Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators (WDI)
3The second big surge of investment abroad from Chile occurred in 2003 and it was lead by
retail companies ( i.e Cencosud , Falabella, Ripley). See Calderón Hoffmann (2006).
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The greatest change that occurred in the Chilean consumption credit market
during the period 2000-2008 is the significant increase in non-bank debt (Central
Bank of Chile (2009)). Figure 2.2 illustrates the evolution of credit cards per adult
in Chile and shows that commercial stores were the most dynamic participant in
this market during the period 1993-2007. The number of active credit cards per
adult provided by commercial stores increased significantly after 1995 and stayed
well above those provided by banks throughout the period 1995-2007.
Figure 2.2: Bank and non bank credit cards (active) per adult in Chile
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras de Chile
Figure 2.3 illustrates the evolution of total credit supplied by commercial stores
in Chile, expressed in constant prices. We can infer from the figure that consumers’
outstanding debt with commercial stores grew faster than real GDP during the
period 2000-2008.
There is a lack of precise information regarding when exactly these new
participants in the credit market became more apparent. Marshall (2004) points
out that while in the early 90s, consumption credit in Chile was mainly supplied
by the traditional banking sector, new suppliers of financial services to households
emerged in the late 90s.
According to Aparici and Yáñez (2004), as banks were decreasing their
participation in total consumption debt during the period 1999-2003, commercial
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stores were placing themselves as second most important source of consumption
credit.
Figure 2.3: The evolution of total credit by commercial stores and GDP in Chile
(thousand millions of 2011 chilean pesos)
Source: Superintendencia Valores y Seguros Chile (SVS) and World Bank - World Development
Indicators (WDI)
Notes: Total credit by commercial stores reflects stock of outstanding consumption debt with
vendors, including refinanced loans. Nominal values were converted to constant prices by diving
the series with the implicit GDP deflator- extracted from the OECD database.
In addition to the emergence of these new credit suppliers, the significant rise
in consumption credit was also a consequence of the increase in credit demand
by new sections of the population (SBIF, 2015). Indeed, Chile was the country
with the highest middle class population growth within the Latin American region
during the period 1995-2010 (Ferreira et al., 2013). About 20% of the population
was considered middle class in 1995 and this percentage jumped to 53% by 2010.
In figure 2.4, I plot the shifting composition of the population in Chile across
income class. While the upper and vulnerable classes remained relatively stable,
there is a clear downward trend for the poor households, and a significant rise in
the middle class.
Casanova and Renck (2015) explain how an increase in the consumer market
size driven by the rising middle class and a delayed response by banks led retailers
to offer credit themselves, in order to boost sales and increase profits.
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Figure 2.4: Percentage of total households by income class in Chile (5 year mean)
Source: Author calculations based on database by Ferreira et al. (2013)
Notes: The classification of income class has been determined for Latin America by the World
Bank and is expressed in 2005 US$ PPP (purchasing power parity)
There are other proposed explanations of the rise of vendors as a non-
traditional source of credit. One is related to marketing strategies. In particular,
the provision and use of store credit cards, which mainly serve purchasing within
the stores of its affiliates, improves customer retention rates (Samsing, 2011).
Another explanation is a change in the regulatory framework implemented
in 1999 by the SBIF, the authority responsible for monitoring and regulating
the financial market in Chile. The new regulation led to the segmentation of
the interest rate ceiling. This regulation increased the maximum rate of interest
that financial and non-financial lenders (including commercial stores) could charge
borrowers, particularly when provided credit in small amounts. Many specialists
claimed that this significantly stimulated the supply of credit cards (Rojas (2011),
Benado (2011)).
Finally, a scandal involving a particular Chilean commercial store in 20114
led policy makers to start questioning this sector’s lending practices, and their
4A recount of the accounting scandal involving the retailer La Polar can be found in McMillan
(2012)
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increasing role in the consumer credit market. There was widespread public
attention to the matter - see Barrionuevo (2011), Knowledge@Wharton (2011)
and Evans (2014) - and studies of vendor financing incentives from a theoretical
perspective were called upon. In the next section, we present a first attempt to
model vendor financing incentives in the market for unsecured credit.
2.3 Introducing vendor financing in the unsecured
credit market
The model presented in this paper adapts the stylized model of Brennan et al.
(1988) and uses it to shed light on the plausible factors behind the rise of vendor
financing in Latin America. We modify their model on the credit demand and
credit supply setup. We substitute farmers demanding credit with households
maximizing utility from consumption, and accumulating durable good services
through purchases of vendor’s goods. In our model, both banks and vendors’
captive financial intermediary offer unsecured credit contracts.
There are five agents in the model- a competitive bank sector, a profit
maximizing vendor, the vendor’s captive financial intermediary and two types
of households.
2.3.1 Households
Constrained households
Constrained households derive utility from their consumption in non-durables
(ct) and services from durables (dt). However, since they don’t have enough cash
in hand to purchase durable goods, they need access to a source of finance to do
so. A key assumption in this model is that if constrained households receive a
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credit offer from banks, they use it solely to finance the purchase of one unit of
the durable good, commercialized at price z1 set by the vendor.
There are two periods. The household’s labor income in the two periods is
denoted by y1 and y2. The first period income is pre-determined and consists of
household’s cash in hand, i.e his labor income net of debt repayment. The second
period income, y2, is stochastic taking one of two possible values y2 ∈ {yL, yH}.
A simplifying assumption is that y1 < yL, so households don’t have incentives
to transfer resources from period 1 to period 2 through savings. In other words,
constrained households spend all their period income in non durable spending5.
Households differ in the probability ρ of receiving the high income yH . We
identify households with type ρ where ρ ∼ Beta(α, β). Borrowing households
know their type.
In the two period optimization problem, we assume each household chooses
non-durable consumption for two periods (c1, c2) and if received a credit offer,
whether to accept or reject the offer that will allow them to purchase one unit of
durable good in the first period.
We assume CRRA preferences over a CES aggregator of non-durable
consumption and services from durable goods. Consistent with empirical findings6,
we assume that period utility takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
U(ct, dt) =
(
cγt d
1−γ
t
)1−σ
1− σ (2.1)
where σ measures the degree of risk aversion and γ captures the weight of each
5The rule of thumb behavior not only simplifies derivations but is also aligned with the
purpose of this paper. We are particularly interested in examining the effect of a larger middle
income class on vendor financing incentives. The improvement of economic conditions of the low
income can be interpreted as an increase in permanent income of constrained households.
6Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) reviews previous empirical literature estimating
CRRA utility functions with a CES aggregator and using US consumption data. Findings
suggest that the intratemporal elasticity of substitution -between services flows from durables
and nondurables- is not significantly different from one.
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type of consumption in household preferences (0 < γ < 1).
If the household hasn’t received a credit offer, then they won’t purchase any
durable goods and they face the following two period optimization problem:
max
{ci1,ci2,Purchase or No Purchase}
U(ci1, d
i
1) + βU(c
i
2, d
i
2)
subject to:
ci1 ≤ yi1
ci2 ≤ yi2
di1 = (1− δ)di0
di2 = (1− δ)2di0
If the household receives a credit offer, they must choose whether to accept
or reject it. If rejected, then the solution of the previous problem applies. If
accepted, then household proceeds to purchase one unit of durable good. In this
case, di1 = 1 + (1− δ)di0 and di2 = (1− δ) + (1− δ)2di0.
The value of accepting a loan will factor in the possibility of default. With
probability ρ, the household receives high income yH in period 2 and pays back
the loan repayment value z2. Conversely, with probability 1 − ρ they receive
low income yL and default. Following the literature of unsecured credit, if they
default, they suffer a utility cost which is equivalent to losing share φ of second
period income. Regardless of paying back or not, they still hold the durable good
purchased in period 1.
The value of autarky (i.e not buying durable goods) for the household is:
V nb(d0, ρ) = U(y1, (1−δ)d0)+βρU(yH , (1−δ)2d0)+β(1−ρ)U(yL, (1−δ)2d0) (2.2)
The value of accepting the credit offer (or equivalently the value of buying one
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unit of durable good) is:
V b(d0, ρ, z2) =U(y1, 1 + (1− δ)d0) + βρU(yH − z2, (1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0) + . . .
β(1− ρ)U((1− φ)yL, (1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0)
Then a household will accept the credit offer and purchase one unit of durable
good as long as
V b(d0, ρ, z2) ≥ V nb(d0, ρ)
For simplicity, we assume that constrained households have such low durable
good stock (dc0) that for any z2 ≤ φyH , the value of accepting the credit offer and
purchase the good is always larger than the value of autarky.
That is, given the share of income lost if default (φ), preference parameters
(γ,β) and depreciation rate δ, their durable good stock satisfies:
(1− φ) βγ(1+β)(1−γ)
1− (1− φ) βγ(1+β)(1−γ)
≥ d0(1− δ)
Derivations in Appendix B.1.
Unconstrained households
Unconstrained households derive utility from their consumption in non-
durables (ct) and services from durables (dt). However, they don’t need access to
credit to increase their expenditure in durable goods since they have unlimited
access to credit provided by banks. Preferences are symmetric to those of
constrained households.
As in Brennan et al. (1988), these households default with probability 0 in their
credit contract. This implies banks offer them credit loans at rate equal to the risk
free interest rate. We assume that unconstrained households not only have first
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period income net of debt payments greater than that of constrained households
but also no uncertainty regarding their second period income. This is aligned with
data suggesting households with financial inclusion tend to have higher income,
more assets and overall lower default risk. For simplicity, we assume there is no
income heterogenity among unconstrained households.
In the two period optimization problem, the unconstrained households choose
non-durable consumption for two periods (c1, c2) and decide to purchase one unit
of durable good in the first period or not. They face the following maximization
problem:
max
{c1,c2,Purchase or No Purchase}
U(c1, d1) + βU(c2, d2)
subject to: c1 + z1x1 +
c2
RB1
= y1 +
y2
RB1
d1 = x1 + (1− δ)d0
(2.3)
where z1 is the relative price of durable goods and x1 ∈ {0, 1} stands for units
of durable goods purchased. Remember we assume that if a household decides to
purchase durable goods, they can only buy one unit per period.
The first order condition for c1 yields:
U1(c
∗
1, d1) =βU1(c
∗
2, d2)R
B
1
with: c∗2 = R
B
1 (y1 − c∗1 − z1x1) + y2
If the household finds purchasing the durable good optimal, x1 = 1 and
durable services for the first and second period are d1 = 1 + (1 − δ)d0 and
d2 = (1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0, respectively. The first order condition for c1 yields:
U1(c
p∗
1 , 1 + (1− δ)d0) =βU1(cp∗2 , (1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0)RB1
with: cp∗2 = R
B
1 (y1 − cp∗1 − z1) + y2
If household finds not purchasing the durable good optimal, x1 = 0 and durable
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services for the first and second period are d1 = (1 − δ)d0 and d2 = (1 − δ)2d0,
respectively. Then, first order condition for c1 yields:
U1(c
np∗
1 , (1− δ)d0) =βU1(cnp∗2 , (1− δ)2d0)RB1
with: cnp∗2 = R
B
1 (y1 − cnp∗1 ) + y2
To determine the decision of buying the durable good or not, the household
compares the value of buying (V br ) versus the value of not buying (V nbr ):
V br =U(c
p∗
1 , 1 + (1− δ)d0) + βU(RB1 (y1 − cp∗1 − z1) + y2, (1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0)
V nbr =U(c
np∗
1 , (1− δ)d0) + βU(RB1 (y1 − cnp∗1 ) + y2, (1− δ)2d0))
An unconstrained household will choose to purchase one unit of durable good
as long as:
V br ≥ V nbr
Notice the value of purchase is negatively related to the relative price of durable
goods z1 and the value of no purchase is independent of z1. This will guarantee
that there is a unique intersection (z∗1) of both value functions such that for values
of z1 < z∗1 , it is optimal to purchase the good, ceteris paribus.
Let y1 = y2 = y¯, then the maximum cash price accepted by unconstrained
households is
(1 +RB1 )
RB1
y¯ Ω(d0, δ, γ) = z
∗
1 (2.4)
where
Ω(d0, δ, γ) = 1−
(
1
(1− δ)d0 + 1
)− (1−γ)
γ
Note, the lower their durable good stock (d0) or the higher their income (y¯),
the higher is the maximum cash price (z∗1) at which they accept to purchase the
durable good.
48
Chapter 2. Rising Middle Class and Vendor Financing Incentives
2.3.2 Banks
This section builds on the profit function of banks described in Livshits et al.
(2016)7. Banks are competitive, they borrow at the exogenously given gross
interest rate RF and make loans to borrowers. Loans take the form of one
period non-contingent bond contracts. However, to offer a new contract, financial
intermediaries incur in a fixed cost χ.
The fixed cost to create a lending contract represents the cost of developing a
screening technology (i.e scorecards), which allows the lender to perfectly assess
borrower’s risk types8. Thus, upon paying the fixed cost χ, a lender observes
borrower’s type. Since each prospective borrower is infinitesimal relative to this
fixed cost, lending contracts have to pool the different constrained household types
to recover the cost of creating the contract.
The contract posted is characterized by (z1, RB, ρ), where RB is the gross
interest rate and ρ is the probability of repayment cut-off defining which
households are eligible. The amount advanced in period 1 is denoted by z1 and is
equivalent to the cash price of durable goods set optimally by the vendor.
Since the eligibility decision is made after the fixed cost has been incurred,
lenders are willing to accept any household who yields non negative operating
profits. In other words, the riskiest household accepted makes no contribution
to the overhead cost χ. Hence a lender offering a risky loan at interest rate RB
rejects all applicants with risk type below a cutoff ρ such that the expected return
from the marginal borrower is zero: ρz2
RF
− z1 = 0, where z2 (= z1 × RB) is the
repayment value. The marginal type accepted into the contract is
ρ =
RF
RB
(2.5)
7See section 7 for a brief explanation on why we choose to differ from the stylized bank
described in Brennan et al. (1988)
8We assume perfect information
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The profit to the lender of extending the credit contract (z1, RB, ρ) to
constrained households is:
Π = −χ+
∫ 1
ρ
(
ρRB
RF
− 1
)
z1 × f(ρ)dρ
where f(ρ) is the probability density function evaluated at ρ. Note the upper limit
of the integral is set at 1. This follows from the assumption that unconstrained
households have such low durable good stock that -regardless of their risk profile-
the value of accepting the credit offer and purchase the good is greater than the
value of remaining in autarky.
Since banks are perfectly competitive, profits in equilibrium are zero. In
equilibrium, and after substituting RB using equation (5), we get:
χ =
∫ 1
ρ
(
ρ
ρ
− 1
)
z1 × f(ρ)dρ (2.6)
Since the right hand side of equation (6) is decreasing in ρ, there will be a
unique ρ for each z1, given χ, RF and the distribution of ρ. All households with
ρ ≥ ρ are offered (and accept) this contract.
In the section describing unconstrained households, we stated that they have
unlimited access to credit provided by banks, they have zero probability of default
and borrow at the risk free interest rate. This can be rationalized by the existence
of a lender offering a one period bond contract only to these households. In this
setup with fixed costs, this lender would have zero fixed costs (i.e χ = 0)9.
Recall from section 2.3.1, that if these households receive high income in second
period (y2 = yH), they won’t default on their debt. This implies repayment value
(z2) should be lower or equal than the income lost if household defaults (φyH).
9If fixed costs are not zero, the interest rate charged to unconstrained households will be a
function of fixed costs, the amount advanced in period 1 and the risk free interest rate
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This condition defines an upper bound zc1 such that for all z1 higher than that
value, banks are not able to extend credit to constrained households since all
borrowers will default with certainty.
In particular, the value zc1 solves:
zc1 = φyHρ
c
where ρc is derived from:
χ =
∫ 1
ρc
(ρ− ρc)φyH × f(ρ)dρ (2.7)
Note ρc is a function of φ, yH , the distribution of ρ ∼ Beta(α, β) and fixed
costs χ.
At the same time, there will be a value zmin1 at which for all z1 lower than that
value, the corresponding ρ derived from 2.6 yields an interest rate higher than
the ceiling rate policy (Rmax). We will assume hereafter that zmin1 < zc1 . If this
assumption doesn’t hold, then neither banks nor vendors have incentives to pay
the fixed cost and offer a new credit contract since all borrowers will default at
the implied repayment value.
Define the region z1 ∈ [zmin1 , zc1] as the feasible set over which banks extends
credit to constrained consumers. Then, the corresponding total number of risky
borrowers is defined as:
q(z1) =

0 If z1 < zmin1
N c × (1−G(ρ)) If z1 ∈ [zmin1 , zc1]
0 If z1 > zc1
(2.8)
where N c is the total number of constrained households and G(.) is the cumulative
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distribution function of risk types.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the bank problem. Figure 2.5a illustrates the
corresponding cutoff of probability of repayment at zmin1 and zc1. The dashed
and continuous lines evaluate the right hand side of equation 2.6 at zmin1 and zc1,
respectively. The intersection of the continuous line with the fixed cost given
by the horizontal line determines the probability of repayment of the marginal
borrower and therefore the interest rate of the contract. Figure 2.5b shows the
repayment value z2 as an increasing function of the amount advanced in period 1
(z1). See proof in Appendix B.2. Note that the feasible region [zmin1 , zc1] will also
yield a lower and upper bound for the repayment value represented in the y-axis.
Figure 2.5c represents number of risky borrowers as function of the cash price. It
is zero for low values, peaks at zmin1 and is a decreasing function of the cash price
up to zc1.
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Figure 2.5: The bank problem
(a) Deriving ρ given z1 and fixed costs
(b) Repayment value (z2) in equilibrium
(c) Credit consumers (% of total constrained) in equilibrium
Notes: Value zc1 satisfies zc1 = φyHρc where ρc is financial intermediary probability of repayment
threshold at zc1. Value zmin1 corresponds to value of cash price for which financial intermediary’s
probability threshold corresponds to the inverse of ceiling rate (Rmax). All subfigures assume
χ = 40, φ = 0.1, yh = 10000, Rmax = 2, E(ρ) = 0.5 and σ2(ρ) = 3.5%.
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2.3.3 The vendor
Consider a company that sells consumption goods to households. The goods
that are produced at a constant marginal cost ν, may be purchased by the
households either using cash or credit. Credit can be offered by the competitive
banking system -previously described- or by the vendor itself (through its captive
finance subsidiary).
Remember there are two types of consumers: constrained households and
unconstrained households. The former are considered “credit customers” by the
vendor since they require access to credit to purchase durable goods they sell. The
latter are considered “cash customers” since they have unlimited access to a risk
free credit market and can pay using cash. As in Brennan et al. (1988), vendors
find profitable to extend credit to constrained customers because they differ in
their price elasticity relative to cash customers. By doing so it enables them to
price discriminate and increase overall sales.
Absence of vendor financing
The vendor chooses the cash price z1 that maximizes profits. As it will be
presented in the next section, under certain conditions, the optimal z1 may attract
both credit and cash customers.
The problem of the manufacturer in the absence of vendor financing is:
max
z1
Π(C) =Nr(z1 − v) + q(z1)(z1 − v)
subject to:
V br (z1) ≥ V nbr
where N r is the number of cash customers and q is the number of credit customers
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defined in the Bank section. The constraint guarantees that cash customer buys
the good. That is the value of purchasing the good for cash customers is equal or
greater than the value of no purchase.
With vendor financing
The problem of the manufacturer who offers vendor financing is to figure out
two prices. In addition to the price offered to cash customers (z1), they need to
solve for the internal transfer price at which goods are sold to a captive finance
subsidiary. That is, the manufacturer is able to charge a lower price to constrained
households by setting the internal transfer price (z′1) below the cash price.
The competitive captive financial subsidiary faces the same fixed costs χ, same
gross interest rate RF at which they borrow and same optimization problem
relative to banks. The only difference is that they observe a lower cash price.
That is, the cutoff ρ solves:
χ =
∫ 1
ρ
(
ρ
ρ
− 1
)
z′1 × f(ρ)dρ (2.9)
As with the Bank, the total number of risky borrowers that results depends
on the value of z′1 :
q(z′1, χ) =

0 If z′1 < zmin1
N c × (1−G(ρ)) If z′1 ∈ [zmin1 , zc1]
0 If z′1 > zc1
(2.10)
With vendor financing, the manufacturer’s profit maximization problem is:
max
z1,z′1
Π(z1, z
′
1) = Nr(z1 − v) + q(z′1, χ)(z′1 − v) (2.11)
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Subject to:
V br (z1) ≥ V nbr (z1) (2.11a)
z′1R
V ≥ z1RF (2.11b)
z′1 ≤ z1 (2.11c)
z′1R
V ≤ φyH (2.11d)
Contraint (11a) is a condition guaranteeing that cash customer buys the good.
This sets the upper bound for the cash price z1.
Constraint (11b) guarantees that no cash customer buys on credit provided by
the vendor. This constraint ensures that the present value of the quoted credit
price (z′1RV /RF ) is not less than the cash price z1. Derivations in Appendix B.3.
Constraint (11c) implies banks won’t be able to offer a better credit contract
to credit customers than vendors. By subsidizing the amount advanced in period
1, the captive financial intermediary is able to charge a lower repayment value z2
to credit customers10.
Finally, the last constraint (11d) defines an upper bound for the internal
transfer price z′1. All values above this upper bound imply that its corresponding
repayment value is greater than the cost of default and all borrowers choose to
default. By setting this constraint, the vendor ensures that the captive financial
intermediary is able to extend credit to constrained households.
10The repayment value is an increasing function of z1. Proof in Appendix B.2
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2.4 Solving vendor’s optimization problem
2.4.1 Absence of vendor financing
The problem of the manufacturer in the absence of vendor financing is:
max
z1
Π(z1) =Nr(z1 − v) + q(z1)(z1 − v)
subject to:
(2.12)
zmax1 (R
F , y¯, du0) ≥ z1 (2.12a)
where zmax1 (RF , y¯, du0) is the maximum cash price at which unconstrained
consumers purchases the vendor’s good
zmax1 (R
F , y¯, du0) =
(1 +RF )
RF
y¯ Ω(du0 , δ, γ)
Ω(du0 , δ, γ) = 1−
(
1
(1− δ)du0
+ 1
)− (1−γ)
γ
Parameters y¯ and du0 are income per period and durable good stock of
unconstrained consumers, respectively. See derivation of zmax1 in Appendix B.5.2.
Remember the number of customers purchasing the good using credit not only
depends on the credit customer market size (N c) but also on the distribution of
probability of repayment and the cash price set by the vendor. The cash price set
by the vendor influences the interest rate and the number of constrained consumers
receiving a credit offer. If it surpasses a given ceiling zc1 then no constrained
consumer can pay back and no credit contract is offered. If it is lower than zmin1 ,
the equilibrium interest rate is larger than that allowed by the ceiling rate policy
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and no credit is offered.
q(z1) =

0 If z1 < zmin1
N c × (1−G(ρ)) If z1 ∈ [zmin1 , zc1]
0 If z1 > zc1
Ceiling zc1 is the maximum amount advanced in period 1 at which credit
customer is able to pay back in period 2 when they receive income yH . That
is zc1 is the maximum z1 that satisfies yH − z1×RB ≥ yH −φyH . In simpler terms,
zc1R
B = φyH where φyH is the amount of high income lost if consumer defaults on
its debt. The value zc1 solves
χ =
∫ a¯
zc1/(φyH)
(
ρ
zc1/(φyH)
− 1
)
zc1 × f(ρ)dρ
Next we present the optimal solution by case.
Case I: zc1 < zmax1
Since q(z1) takes three functional forms depending on the value of z1, we define
three Lagrangians for the vendor’s optimization problem.
For z1 > zc1,
L(z1, λ) = Nr(z1 − v) + λ[zmax1 − z1]
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions
L1(z∗1 , λ∗) =Nr − λ∗ = 0
L2(z∗1 , λ∗) =[zmax1 − z∗1 ] ≥ 0
λ∗ ≥ 0
λ[zmax1 − z∗1 ] = 0
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These conditions are satisfied when:
z∗1 = z
max
1 λ
∗ = Nr
For zmin1 < z1 ≤ zc1,
L(z1, λ) = Nr(z1 − v) + q(z1)(z1 − v) + λ[zc1 − z1]
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions
L1(z∗1 , λ∗) =Nr + q(z∗1) + (z∗1 − v)
dq(z1)
dz1
∣∣∣∣
z1=z∗1
− λ∗ = 0
L2(z∗1 , λ∗) =[zc1 − z∗1 ] ≥ 0
λ∗ ≥ 0
λ[zc1 − z∗1 ] = 0
These conditions are satisfied when:
z∗1 = z
c
1 λ
∗ = Nr + q(z∗1) + (z
∗
1 − v)
dq(z1)
dz1
∣∣∣∣
z1=z∗1
> 0
Note λ∗ > 0 since
dq(z)
dz1
> 0 ∀z1 ∈ [v, zmax1 ]
Result λ∗ > 0, follows from d(q(z1)×(z1−v))
dz1
> 0. Derivation in Appendix B.4.
For z1 ≤ zmin1 , the lagrangian at the optimum is
L(z∗1 , λ∗) = Nr(z∗1 − v) + q(z∗1)(z∗ − v) + λ[zmin1 − z1]
where Kuhn-Tucker conditions are defined similarly as above and are satisfied
when:
z∗1 = z
min
1 λ
∗ = Nr + q(z∗1) + (z
∗
1 − v)
dq(z1)
dz1
∣∣∣∣
z1=z∗1
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Given these three solutions, we define three profit functions:
ΠI,A0 =Nr(z
max
1 − v)
ΠI,B0 =Nr(z
c
1 − v) + q(zc1)(zc1 − v)
ΠI,C0 =Nr(z
min
1 − v) + q(zmin1 )(zmin1 − v)
Note ΠI,C0 < Π
I,B
0 ∀v and Nr. Therefore, the optimal choice z∗1 can be
summarized as follows:
z∗1 =

zmax1 If
zmax1 −v
zc1−v ≥ 1 +
Nc
Nr
(1−G(ρ(zc1)))
zc1 If
zmax1 −v
zc1−v < 1 +
Nc
Nr
(1−G(ρ(zc1)))
The corresponding number of credit customers at each solution
q(z∗1 , χ) =

0 If z∗1 = zmax1
N c (1−G(ρ(zc1))) If z∗1 = zc1
The corresponding profit functions at each solution
ΠNV FI =

Nr(z
max
1 − v) If z
max
1 −v
zc1−v ≥ 1 +
Nc
Nr
(1−G(ρ(zc1)))
Nr(z
c
1 − v) + q(zc1, χ)(zc1 − v) If z
max
1 −v
zc1−v < 1 +
Nc
Nr
(1−G(ρ(zc1)))
Note that the solution z∗1 = zc1 is more likely when the number of credit
customers q(zc1) is significantly higher than that of cash consumers (N r). Another
set of conditions under which zc1 may be the optimal solution is when zmax1 decreases
and moves closer to zc1. In other words, when second period income for the cash
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customer y¯ decreases and/or their durable good stock is high enough.
Case II: zc1 ≥ zmax1
Assuming that is always optimal to sell to cash customers, there are two
subcases.
If zmax1 > zmin1 ,
L(z1, λ) = Nr(z1 − v) + q(z1, χ)(z1 − v) + λ[zmax1 − z1]
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions
L1(z∗1 , λ∗) =Nr + q(z∗1 , χ) + (z∗1 − v)
dq(z1)
dz1
∣∣∣∣
z1=z∗1
− λ∗ = 0
L2(z∗1 , λ∗) =[zmax1 − z∗1 ] ≥ 0
λ∗ ≥ 0
λ[zmax1 − z∗1 ] = 0
These conditions are satisfied when:
z∗1 = z
max
1 λ
∗ = Nr + q(zmax1 , χ) + (z
max
1 − v)
dq(z1, χ)
dz1
∣∣∣∣
z1=zmax1
If zmax1 < zmin1
L(z1, λ) = Nr(z1 − v) + λ[zmax1 − z1]
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The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions
L1(z∗1 , λ∗) =Nr − λ∗ = 0
L2(z∗1 , λ∗) =[zmax1 − z∗1 ] ≥ 0
λ∗ ≥ 0
λ[zmax1 − z∗1 ] = 0
These conditions are satisfied when:
z∗1 = z
max
1 λ
∗ = Nr
Note that it is always optimal to set z∗1 = zmax1 . The corresponding number of
credit customers:
q(zmax1 ) =

0 If zmax1 < zmin1
N c (1−G(ρ(zmax1 ))) If zmax1 ≥ zmin1
The corresponding profit:
ΠNV FII =

Nr(z
max
1 − v) If zmax1 < zmin1
Nr(z
max
1 − v) + q(zmax1 )(zmax1 − v) If zmax1 ≥ zmin1
2.4.2 With vendor financing
With vendor financing, the manufacturer’s profit maximization problem is:
max
z1,z′1
Π(z1, z
′
1) =Nr(z1 − v) + q(z′1, χ)(z′1 − v)
subject to:
(2.13)
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zmax1 (R
F , y¯, du0) ≥ z1 (2.13a)
z′1
ρ(z′1)
≥ z1RF (2.13b)
z′1 ≤ z1 (2.13c)
z′1
ρ(z′1)
≤ φyH (2.13d)
where
zmax1 (R
F , y¯, du0) =
(1 +RF )
RF
y¯ × Ω(du0 , δ, γ)
Ω(du0 , δ, γ) = 1−
(
1
(1− δ)du0
+ 1
)− (1−γ)
γ
Next we present the optimal solution by case.
Case I: zc1 < zmax1
We define the Lagrangian as
L(z1, z′1, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) =Nr(z1 − v) + q(z′1)(z′1 − v)+
+ λ1[z
max
1 − z1] + λ2
[
z′1
ρ(z′1)
− z1RF
]
+
+ λ3[z1 − z′1] + λ4
[
φyH − z
′
1
ρ(z′1)
]
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The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions
L1(z∗1 , z′∗1 ,λ∗) =Nr − λ∗1 − λ∗2RF + λ∗3 = 0
L2(z∗1 , z′∗1 ,λ∗) =q(z′∗1 ) + (z′∗1 − v)
dq(z1)
dz1
∣∣∣∣
z1=z′∗1
+ λ∗2
[
1
ρ(z1)
− z1
ρ(z1)2
dρ
dz1
] ∣∣∣∣
z1=z′∗1
+ . . .
− λ∗3 − λ∗4
[
1
ρ(z1)
− z1
ρ(z1)2
dρ
dz1
] ∣∣∣∣
z1=z′∗1
= 0
dL(z∗1 , z′∗1 ,λ∗)
dλ1
=zmax1 − z1 ≥ 0
dL(z∗1 , z′∗1 ,λ∗)
dλ2
=
z′1
ρ(z′1)
− z1RF ≥ 0
dL(z∗1 , z′∗1 ,λ∗)
dλ3
=z1 − z′1 ≥ 0
dL(z∗1 , z′∗1 ,λ∗)
dλ4
=φyH − z
′
1
ρ(z′1)
≥ 0
λ∗1 ≥ 0 λ∗2 ≥ 0 λ∗3 ≥ 0 λ∗4 ≥ 0
λ∗1[z
max
1 − z1] = 0
λ∗2
[
z′1
ρ(z′1)
− z1RF
]
= 0
λ∗3[z1 − z′1] = 0
λ∗4
[
φyH − z
′
1
ρ(z′1)
]
= 0
We have two cases,
a) If RF zmax1 ≤ φyH
The K-T conditions are satisfied at
z∗1 = z
max
1 z
′∗
1 = z
c
1
λ∗1 = N
r; λ∗2 = 0; λ
∗
3 = 0
λ∗4 =
(
q(zc1) + (z
c
1 − v)
dq(z1)
dz1
∣∣∣∣
z1=zc1
)
×
([
1
ρ(z1)
− z1
ρ(z1)2
dρ
dz1
]−1 ∣∣∣∣
z1=zc1
)
> 0
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b) If RF zmax1 > φyH
The K-T conditions are satisfied at
z∗1 =
φyH
RF
z′∗1 = z
c
1
λ∗1 = 0; λ
∗
2 =
N r
RF
; λ∗3 = 0
λ∗4 =
(
q(zc1) + (z
c
1 − v)
dq(z1)
dz1
∣∣∣∣
z1=zc1
)
×
([
1
ρ(z1)
− z1
ρ(z1)2
dρ
dz1
]−1 ∣∣∣∣
z1=zc1
)
+
N r
RF
> 0
Summarizing, the optimal choice (z∗1 , z′∗1 ) can be described as follows:
(z∗1 , z
′∗
1 ) =

(zmax1 , z
c
1) If RF zmax1 ≤ φyH
(φyH
RF
, zc1) If RF zmax1 > φyH
Note that it is always optimal to set the internal transfer price z′1 at the
maximum zc1, since the first derivative of the profit function relative to z′1 is
always positive, regardless of the mean and variance of probability of repayment
distribution11.
The profit function for each corresponding case:
ΠV FI =

N r(zmax1 − v) + q(zc1, χ)(zc1 − v) If RF zmax1 ≤ φyH
N r
(
φyH
RF
− v)+ q(zc1, χ)(zc1 − v) If RF zmax1 > φyH
11This result follows from d(q(z1)×(z1−v))dz1 > 0, proved in Appendix.
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Case II: zc1 ≥ zmax1
We define the Lagrangian as
L(z1, z′1, λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) =Nr(z1 − v) + q(z′1, χ)(z′1 − v)+
+ λ1[z
max
1 − z1] + λ2
[
z′1
ρ(z′1)
− z1RF
]
+
+ λ3[z1 − z′1] + λ4
[
φyH − z
′
1
ρ(z′1)
]
In this case, it is always optimal to set z∗1 = z′∗1 = zmax1 . That means price
discrimination doesn’t increase profits. The corresponding number of credit
customers:
q(zmax1 , χ) =

0 If zmax1 < zmin1
N c (1−G(ρ(zmax1 ))) If zmax1 ≥ zmin1
The corresponding profit:
ΠV FII =

Nr(z
max
1 − v) If zmax1 < zmin1
Nr(z
max
1 − v) + q(zmax1 , χ)(zmax1 − v) If zmax1 ≥ zmin1
2.5 Vendor financing gains
To derive vendor financing gains, we will only focus in the case zc1 < zmax1 . The
previous section showed that if this condition doesn’t hold, then there are never
incentives to use vendor financing as a mean to price discriminate customers.
Given all structural parameters in the economy, we define vendor financing
gains (V F ) as the difference between profits with vendor financing at the optimal
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choices of z1 and z′1 and profits in the absence of vendor financing at the optimal
cash price z1.
In the previous section, we found that in the absence of vendor financing there
are two cases: one in which vendors find profitable to sell to cash customers only
and another one in which vendors set a lower cash price to attract both cash and
credit customers. Under vendor financing we also found two cases: one in which
vendors set the cash price equal to the maximum price accepted by cash customers
and another one in which they set a lower cash price so that cash customers won’t
turn credit customers. For this reason, we derive and summarize below four cases
defining vendor financing gains.
Case 1. z
max
1 −v
zc1−v ≥ 1 +
Nc
Nr
(1−G(ρ(zc1))) and RF zmax1 ≤ φyH
VF(1) = q(zc1, χ)(z
c
1 − v) (2.14)
Case 2. z
max
1 −v
zc1−v ≥ 1 +
Nc
Nr
(1−G(ρ(zc1))) and RF zmax1 > φyH
VF(2) = N r
(
φyH
RF
− zmax1
)
+ q(zc1, χ)(z
c
1 − v) (2.15)
Note V F (2) > 0 if
N c
N r
(1−G(ρ(zc1))) (zc1 − v) > zmax1 −
φyH
RF
Case 3. z
max
1 −v
zc1−v < 1 +
Nc
Nr
(1−G(ρ(zc1))) and RF zmax1 ≤ φyH
VF(3) = N r(zmax1 − zc1) (2.16)
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Case 4. z
max
1 −v
zc1−v < 1 +
Nc
Nr
(1−G(ρ(zc1))) and RF zmax1 > φyH
VF(4) = N r
(
φyH
RF
− zc1
)
(2.17)
Cases 1 and 2 correspond to the scenario at which the vendor, absent of vendor
financing, finds profitable to sell only to cash customers. In cases 3 and 4 the
vendor, absent of vendor financing, optimally chooses a lower cash price so that
she sells to both cash and constrained consumers (the latter through bank credit).
2.6 Comparative statics
The core results of this section are derived from comparative statics exercises
on gains from vendor financing- defined as the difference between profit of the
manufacturer with vendor financing and in the absence of it.
We will evaluate how gains from vendor financing changes when
1. There is an increase in the market size of credit customers N c.
2. There is a rise in the mean of repayment probability in the credit customer
market.
3. There is a change in the fixed cost χ incurred by the financial sector (proxy
for financial development).
4. There is a change in default costs (proxy for a change in bankruptcy policy)
We won’t present comparative statics on vendor financing gains under cases 3
and 4 described in the previous section. These cases reflect a scenario in which a
rise of vendor financing gains, ceteris paribus, is not associated with an increase
in credit supply on its extensive margin but with a switch of source of credit for
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the constrained household sector. Instead, section 2.2 presents evidence that there
was indeed an increase in consumption credit in Chile during the recent decade
and that it was particularly driven by the emergence of vendors as new credit
suppliers. Furthermore, there is evidence that this led to a rise in credit on its
extensive margin as loans from vendors tend to be held by new “middle class”
shoppers who need credit to purchase their goods (Casanova and Renck, 2015).
By focusing on vendor financing gains derived for cases 1 and 2, we are
more aligned with data. Under both of these cases, a rise in vendor financing
is correlated with greater credit access for constrained households.
2.6.1 An increase in the credit customer market size N c
The following equation illustrates the partial derivative of VF with respect to
the credit customer market size N c.
dV F
dN c
= (1−G(ρ)) (φyHρ− v) > 0 (2.18)
As the number of credit customers increase, vendor financing gains
unambigously rise.
2.6.2 An increase in the mean of the distribution of ρ
Equation below illustrates the partial derivative of VF with respect to the
mean µ.
dV F
dµ
=
dq(N c, ρ)
dµ
× (φyHρ− v) + q(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)× φyH dρ
dµ
(2.19)
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where
dq(N c, ρ)
dµ
= N c
∫ 1
ρ
df(ρ)
dµ
dρ−N cf(ρ)dρ
dµ
(2.20)
where f(ρ) is the density function, df(ρ)
dµ
its derivative relative to the mean and
dρ
dµ
> 0 (see proof in Appendix B.6.1).
A rise in the mean on the probability of repayment from constrained households
implies that a higher mass of credit customers have now a lower risk of default.
The pooling of borrowers to cover the same fixed costs stops at a marginal
borrower relatively safer than previously. This means that the probability of
repayment cutoff above which constrained households are offered a credit offer is
higher. Equivalently, the interest rate offered in the contract is lower. Figure 2.6a
illustrates the higher probability of repayment threshold after an increase in the
mean.
We proved earlier that the vendor finds optimal to set the internal transfer
price at its largest feasible value, i.e that at which its corresponding repayment
value equals the cost of defaulting. Since there is no change in the default cost
and the increase in mean decreases the interest rate, the internal transfer price
will have to increase. This will tend to increase vendor financing gains. Figure
2.6b illustrates the higher internal transfer price on the x-axis after an increase in
the mean.
At the same time, given assumptions of a relatively dispersed probability
of repayment distribution (i.e variance=1.97%), a higher mean will also result
in a larger number of credit borrowers. Therefore, a rise in the mean will
unambiguously increase vendor financing gains. Figure 2.6c illustrates this result
for a variance=3.97%.
However, it is worth noting that under sufficiently low variances, a higher mean
will decrease the number of borrowers. But even in this case, we may still derive
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a condition under which vendor financing gains may still increase. In particular,
gains will increase after a rise in the average probability of repayment as long as
the marginal cost is higher than a threshold v∗µ defined as
ρ+
(∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
)
× ∫ 1ρ (ρ− ρ)× df(ρ)dµ dρ(∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
∫ 1
ρ
df(ρ)
dµ
dρ+ f(ρ)
∫ 1
ρ (ρ− ρ)× df(ρ)dµ dρ
)
φyH = vµ∗ (2.21)
See its derivation in Appendix B.7.1.
2.6.3 A rise in financial sector’ fixed costs
The partial derivative of VF with respect to fixed costs χ is defined as:
dV F
dχ
=
dq(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)
dχ
× (φyHρ− v) + q(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)× φyH dρ
dχ
(2.22)
where
dq(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)
dχ
= −N cf(ρ)(φyHρ− v) dρ
dχ
(2.23)
A rise in fixed costs will require a greater pool of borrowers to cover them and
this will have two opposite effects.
First, it will decrease the internal transfer price. Since more constrained
households need to be pooled, the marginal borrower accepted will tend to be
riskier. That is dρ
dχ
< 0, see proof in Appendix B.6.2. This lower probability of
repayment cutoff will yield a higher interest rate offered in the credit contract.
Given default costs (φyH), the vendor will optimally choose a lower internal
transfer price and this decreases vendor financing gains.
Second, a rise in fixed costs will unambiguosly increase the number of credit
borrowers, since
(
dq(Nc,χ,φ,µ,σ2)
dχ
)
> 0. This will increase vendor financing gains.
Figures 2.7b and 2.7c illustrate the opposite effect on the internal transfer price
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and number of credit borrowers.
To pin down the net effect we need to know the size of marginal cost v relative
to default costs φyH . When v is higher than a given threshold v∗, a rise in fixed
costs will reduce vendor financing gains. On the contrary, when v is lower than v∗
a rise in fixed costs increases vendor financing gains. The marginal cost threshold
is derived in Appendix B.7.2 and defined as:
v∗ =
(
ρ−
∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
f(ρ)
)
φyH
In general, vendor financing gains after a marginal change in fixed costs
decreases in the marginal cost. That is, given default costs φyH , an increase
in fixed costs will yield higher vendor financing incentives the lower is v.
2.6.4 A change in bankrupcty cost for consumer
Unlike previous comparative exercises, the partial derivative of vendor
financing gains for case 1 and case 2 won’t be equal, instead dV F (1)
dφ
< dV F
(2)
dφ
.
We choose to illustrate case 1. The partial derivative of V F (1) with respect to
default cost φ is defined as:
dV F (1)
dφ
=
dq(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)
dφ
×(φyHρ−v)+q(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)φyH dρ
dφ
+q(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)ρyH
(2.24)
where
dq(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)
dφ
= −N cf(ρ)dρ
dφ
(2.25)
A rise in default costs will increase the maximum repayment value to be charged
by the captive financial intermediary and this will have two opposite effects.
First, it will increase the maximum internal transfer price that vendors are
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able to charge and profit maximization would yield a higher zc1 (figure 2.8b). This
higher amount advanced in the first period by the captive financial intermediary,
will require less constrained households to be pooled (figure 2.8a). Then the
marginal borrower accepted will tend to be safer12 and vendor financing gains
increase.
Second, a rise in default costs will unambiguously decrease the number of
credit borrowers, since
(
dq(Nc,χ,φ,µ,σ2)
dφ
)
< 0. This will reduce vendor financing
gains. Figure 2.8c illustrates the effect of a higher internal transfer price on the
number of credit borrowers.
To pin down the net effect we need to know the size of marginal cost v relative
to default costs φyH . When v is higher than a given threshold v∗∗, a rise in default
cost will increase vendor financing gains. On the contrary, when v is lower than v∗∗
a rise in default costs reduces vendor financing gains. The marginal cost threshold
is derived in Appendix B.7.3 and defined as:
v∗∗ =
ρ− ρφyH
χ
×
(∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
)2
f(ρ)
−
∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
f(ρ)
φyH
In general, vendor financing gains after a marginal change in default costs
increase in the marginal cost. That is, given default costs φyH , an increase in
default costs will yield higher vendor financing incentives the higher is v.
12This follows dρdφ > 0, see proof in Appendix B.6.3
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Figure 2.6: An increase in the mean
(a) Deriving ρ(zc1), given χ, φ and yH
(b) Repayment value z2 (= z1/ρ(z1))
(c) Credit consumers (% of total constrained) in equilibrium
Notes: Continuous and dashed lines in (a) represent F (zc1) and F (zmin1 ) respectively. Value zc1
satisfies zc1 = φyHρc where ρc is probability of repayment threshold at zc1. Value zmin1 is value of
cash price at which its probability threshold corresponds to the inverse of ceiling rate (Rmax).
All subfigures assume χ = 40, φ = 0.1, yh = 10000 and Rmax = 2
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Figure 2.7: A rise in financial sector’s fixed cost
(a) Deriving ρ(zc1), given χ, φ and yH
(b) Repayment value z2 (= z1/ρ(z1))
(c) Credit consumers (% of total constrained) in equilibrium
Notes: Continuous and dashed lines in (a) represent F (zc1) and F (zmin1 ) respectively. Value zc1
satisfies zc1 = φyHρc where ρc is probability of repayment threshold at zc1. Value zmin1 is value of
cash price at which its probability threshold corresponds to the inverse of ceiling rate (Rmax).
All subfigures assume φ = 0.1, yh = 10000, Rmax = 2, E(ρ) = 0.5 and σ2(ρ) = 3.5%
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Figure 2.8: An increase in default costs
(a) Deriving ρ(zc1), given χ, φ and yH
(b) Repayment value z2 (= z1/ρ(z1))
(c) Credit consumers (% of total constrained) in equilibrium
Notes: Continuous and dashed lines in (a) represent F (zc1) and F (zmin1 ) respectively. Value zc1
satisfies zc1 = φyHρc where ρc is probability of repayment threshold at zc1. Value zmin1 is value of
cash price at which its probability threshold corresponds to the inverse of ceiling rate (Rmax).
All subfigures assume χ = 40, yh = 10000, Rmax = 2, E(ρ) = 0.5 and σ2(ρ) = 3.5%
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2.7 Testing model implications and assumptions
2.7.1 Supporting bank framework
We differ from the stylized bank sector described in Brennan et al. (1988) for
two reasons. First, banks in our model offer unsecured credit contracts. Second,
banks in our model choose who to lend to and won’t merely supply credit to
everyone demanding it as Brennan et al. assume.
If we use their setup, financial exclusion (measured by lack of use of bank
credit services) could only be derived from lack of demand. Extending our simple
framework by including durable good stock heterogeneity among constrained
households, financial exclusion not only would derive from lack of demand but also
from some supply barriers that impede individuals from accessing credit services.
This is highly relevant as financial inclusion is a particularly important priority
for developing and emerging countries of Latin America (García et al., 2013).
Empirical evidence for the region suggests financial exclusion can’t be attributed
solely to barriers limiting credit demand or to those limiting supply, but rather is
jointly determined by both (Rojas-Suarez and Amado, 2014).
Fixed costs is the key mechanism that leads banks in our setup to choose who
receives credit and through which supply barriers arise. Unlike in Brennan et al.
where lenders never know borrower’s risk type, in our model, banks can have some
information (in this case, perfect) after paying this fixed cost.
There is supporting evidence that fixed costs for banks in the region are
significantly high. A common indicator of banks’ operational inefficiency is the
ratio of overhead (administrative) costs to total assets. High ratios tend to increase
the fixed costs of extending loans. Rojas-Suarez and Amado (2014) find that the
median value for Latin America is over 50 percent higher than the median value
for countries with similar real income per capita. This evidence supports our setup
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over the simple framework of Brennan with no fixed costs.
Finally, our model allow us to derive implications of reducing fixed costs on the
percentage of constrained households using credit services. This is an interesting
comparative statics exercise since high operational costs is one of many causes of
financial exclusion in Latin America.
2.7.2 Vendor supplies credit to financially constrained
households only
An assumption by the model is that vendors wish to only offer credit contracts
to households in need of credit to purchase their goods. In addition, their
optimization problem leads them to offer better credit contract terms than banks.
Put together, we expect to see a higher percentage of households holding vendor
credit at the lower quintiles of income distribution.
To check this we use the Household financial survey 2007 conducted by the
Central Bank of Chile and measure the percentage of total households holding
vendor credit by income quintile. Figure 2.9 shows that commercial stores are the
main consumption credit provider for the lower income quintiles in Chile. On the
contrary, there is greater tendency to hold bank credit in the form of credit lines or
credit cards as income increases. Interestingly, as income increases the tendency
to hold both types of lending also increases.
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Figure 2.9: Source of consumption credit by income quintile (% of reporting
Households in 2007)
Source: Household financial survey 2007. Central Bank of Chile
Notes: Other credit is the sum of educational credit, auto loans and other credit provided by
the government for social purposes.
2.8 Concluding remarks
Motivated by the emergence of the vendor financing channel in the
consumption credit market of various latin american countries, this paper proposes
a vendor financing model in the market for unsecured credit, following the intuition
by Brennan et al. (1988).
Using the comparative statics exercises for the model, we find that the
improvement of economic conditions of the low income and financially constrained
households raises vendor financing incentives, as suggested by earlier papers.
Improved economic conditions are interpreted by the model as either an increase in
the size of the credit customers market, or an increase in their average repayment
probability. The model’s definition of credit customers is mainly an income-based
one. Credit customers are defined as households with a certain income level and
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a low durable good stock, who require access to credit to purchase the vendor’s
durable good.
There are two main findings in this study. First, an increase in the market
size of those regarded as credit customers unambiguously raises vendor financing
incentives. The higher number of credit customers can be interpreted as additional
households crossing poverty thresholds. Second, as credit customers become
relatively safer, i.e the mean of probability of repayment increases, vendor
financing incentives increase, provided the distribution of riskiness is dispersed
enough.
In addition, we also explore how a change in financial development and default
costs, affect vendor financing incentives through the lens of the model.
In the model, higher financial development is reflected by a lower cost of
developing a screening technology to assess borrower risk types. The lower
this cost is, the lower is the number of credit customers potentially served by
vendors’ captive financial intermediary. This will tend to decrease vendor financing
incentives. On the other hand, since fewer credit customers need to be pooled to
cover lower fixed costs, the credit contract will offer a lower interest rate. Vendors
will, therefore, optimally increase the internal transfer price and this in turn will
increase vendor financing gains. The net effect of higher financial development will
be pinned down by the size of marginal cost relative to default costs. If marginal
costs are low enough, the net effect is a decrease in vendor financing gains.
We also find that as default cost increases, the maximum repayment value
charged to borrowers increases, yielding a higher upper bound for the choice of
internal transfer price. Since the profit function from selling to credit customers is
increasing in the subsidized price, vendors will optimally choose a higher internal
transfer price and vendor financing gains increase. At the same time, given the
higher amount advanced in the first period, the captive financial intermediary will
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have to pool fewer borrowers to cover fixed costs. This decrease in the number of
borrowers decreases vendor financing gains. Similarly, as in the case of fixed costs,
the net effect will depend on the relative size of marginal costs v. If marginal
costs are low enough, the net effect of higher default costs is a decrease in vendor
financing gains.
Our ongoing research is testing theoretical results derived in the comparative
statics section and summarized above, using Household financial surveys and
vendor financing available data in Chile.
Even though the segmentation of the maximum interest rate is another
plausible reason behind the rise in vendor financing in Chile, we don’t include
the analysis in this paper. We believe that analysis would be more rigorous in
models allowing an equilibrium with both banks and vendors supplying unsecured
credit to the constrained household sector. The model we proposed yields an
equilibrium in which only vendors supply credit to constrained households. This
is -partially- derived from the simplifying assumption that credit contracts offered
by banks has the sole purpose to finance durable goods sold by the vendor. I leave
these extensions for future research.
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Business cycle implications of rising household
credit market participation in emerging countries
3.1 Introduction
According to the literature on emerging market business cycles, emerging
economies are subject to greater financial frictions relative to developed small
open economies. Even though financial systems in emerging countries of Latin
America are still less developed than those in their more advanced counterparts,
private credit -a common measure of financial depth- has been steadily increasing
during the last two decades (figure 3.1). Hansen and Sulla (2013) examine the rise
of credit to private sector in 18 countries from Latin America and finds that the
increase was mainly driven by unsecured credit to households.
During the period 1995-2010, countries in the region were also observing
a significant increase in their middle income class population as poverty rates
declined (Ferreira et al., 2013). This not only increased credit demand but also
motivated the entry of new suppliers in the consumer credit market. According to
Obermann (2006) and Montero and Tarzijan (2010), in countries such as Mexico,
Colombia, Chile and Brazil, new providers from international and national-level
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retail chains emerged as main credit suppliers for “new middle class shoppers”.
Figure 3.1: Domestic credit to private sector in Latin America (% GDP)
Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators (WDI)
Both the increase in the fraction of population that is more likely to have
financial access (middle class) and the increase in credit supply particularly for
lower income households are indicative of a rise in credit market participation by
households in emerging Latin America. We study the business cycle implications
of this phenomenon in a dynamic general equilibrium model suitable for emerging
economies. We focus on the effect of rising household credit market participation
on consumption growth volatility.
We choose to extend Chang and Fernández (2013) model (CF hereafter) with
an exogenous fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers coexisting with households that
are able to smooth income fluctuations. The model by CF is chosen since it
encompasses two alternative mechanisms typically used by the literature to explain
business cycles in emerging markets. In the model, rule of thumb consumers are
households that do not own any assets nor have any liabilities; they just consume
83
Chapter 3. Business cycle implications
their current labor income. While there may be several interpretations for this
behavior, one is their lack of access to capital markets 1. The assumed behavior for
rule-of-thumb consumers follows Galí et al. (2004) and Bilbiie and Straub (2013)2;
it is admittedly simplistic and justified only on tractability grounds.
Using Mexico as case study, we estimate the extended model and find that a
rise in credit market participation by households has a positive effect on aggregate
volatility of key macro aggregates (i.e consumption and trade balance). We find
that financial frictions play a key role on the relationship between credit market
participation and volatility. Finally, standard measures of predictive accuracy
suggest that the extended business cycle model with rule of thumb households
outperforms the standard restricted version.
A side contribution of this paper is that it is the first attempt to estimate the
fraction of financially excluded households in an emerging country using aggregate
data and a structural approach. Figure 3.2 presents selected measures of financial
depth and access across two types of small open economies and following Cihak
et al. (2012). Measures related to access are also typically used to reflect financial
inclusion (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2015). As emerging countries of Latin America
tend to have lower financial inclusion relative to developed small open economies,
it is reasonable to expect a significant fraction of financially constrained households
in emerging economies. Our estimation results suggest that approximately 75% of
total households in Mexico are financially excluded. Quantifying the fraction of
rule of thumb consumers is an important contribution since it has monetary policy
implications. Iyer (2016) derives optimal monetary policy rules in a small open
economy model embedding both rule of thumb and unconstrained households. As
1Other interpretations include myopia, fear of saving and ignorance of intertemporal trading
opportunities.
2Both papers embed rule of thumb consumers in a otherwise conventional sticky price model.
Galí et al. (2004) shows how their presence can change dramatically the properties of widely used
interest rate rules. Bilbiie and Straub (2013) show that the relatively low level in asset market
participation was behind macroeconomic performance and passiveness of monetary policy during
the Great Inflation episode (pre-Volcker period).
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financial exclusion and openness increase, the optimal weight placed on minimizing
output gap volatility relative to domestic inflation volatility, also increases. The
author finds that targeting nominal exchange rate stability -not inflation targeting-
seems to be the optimal monetary policy in emerging economies with limited
financial inclusion.
This paper is related to two strands of literature.
The first corresponds to the literature on emerging market business cycles.
The key moments characterizing data from emerging countries are: the marked
countercyclicality of the trade balance, the high volatility of consumption and
investment relative to output, and the countercyclicality of real interest rates. In
its attempt to match these stylized facts, this literature has offered two leading
approaches. The first one is the theoretical framework of Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) that incorporates shocks to the growth trend of income. A second approach
leaded by Neumeyer and Perri (2005) is that of financial frictions which induce
endogenous fluctuations in real interest rates and imply an aggregate labor demand
sensitive to real interest rate shocks. Other influential papers within this approach
are Uribe and Yue (2006), García-Cicco et al. (2010) and Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2011). Chang and Fernández (2013) embeds both approaches and finds that
the financial frictions story is relatively more relevant when explaining business
cycles in Mexico. However, nothing has been yet said about whether data supports
a model with limited credit market participation by households. If it does, a
reappraisal of the trend versus financial frictions race may be called upon.
The second related literature is that examining the link between financial
development and aggregate volatility. On the empirical side, Fulford (2013) finds
that increased access to credit in rural India yielded a consumption boom in the
short run, followed by a reduction in consumption in the long run. Kose et al.
(2003) document the non linear relationship between financial openness and the
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volatility of consumption growth relative to that of output growth. At low levels
of financial openness, a marginal rise in gross capital flows tends to increase the
ratio of consumption volatility to output volatility. Bekaert et al. (2006) show
that financial liberalization is mostly associated with lower consumption growth
volatility and even though results are weaker for liberalizing emerging markets,
they never observe a significant increase in real volatility.
On the theoretical side, Philippe et al. (2004) shows that in economies with
intermediate level of financial development, temporary shocks will have large and
persistent real effects. The main mechanism yielding this result is that investment
by firms within economies with an intermediate level of financial development tend
to be more sensitive to cash flows shocks relative to investment in more financially
developed economies. Levchenko (2005) finds that when access to international
markets is not available to all members of society, financial liberalization would
reduce the amount of risk sharing attained at home and raise the volatility of
consumption. Leblebicioğlu (2009) illustrates that non-traded sector firms, facing
collateral constrains and that can only borrow from the domestic financial system,
are inherently more volatile than firms from the traded sector. Under financial
integration, households supplying labor to the non traded sector have international
assets to insure themselves with and do not need to resort to supply labor to
the traded sector as a mean of insurance. Then the terms of trade remain
relatively stable and consumption tends to be more volatile than under financial
autarky. Aghion et al. (2010) find that relaxing credit constrains leads to lower
aggregate volatility through its effect on the cyclical composition of investment.
Basu and Macchiavelli (2015) argue that a plausible explanation on why emerging
countries tend to have higher volatility of consumption relative to output, is that
households in emerging economies are subject to significant borrowing constrains
relative to those in more developed economies. Better ability to borrow reflected
by a relaxation of collateral constrains during economic expansions leads to
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greater consumption volatility relative to output. The authors provide empirical
evidence that higher indices of financial development in emerging economies tend
to increase consumption volatility relative to output, opposite to what is observed
in developed countries.
We differ from this literature in that our model illustrates the effect of financial
access and stability -two characteristics behind the broad definition of financial
development- on consumption growth volatility. The model interprets higher
financial access as a decline in the fraction of financially excluded households. An
increase in financial stability is associated with a reduction in parameters governing
reduced form financial frictions affecting output volatility. Our findings suggest
that an increase of financial access within an emerging country leads to higher
consumption growth volatility and that lesser financial frictions would dampen
the marginal effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the extended
model. Section II estimates the model using Mexican data and by adopting the
Bayesian framework. In Section III, using the full sample estimates, we illustrate
the relationship between credit market participation and aggregate volatility of key
aggregates (i.e consumption growth and trade balance) in an emerging country.
In addition, we show the key role of financial frictions. Section IV verifies
that macroeconomic data of Mexico suggests a significant rise in credit market
participation in the recent decade and that this structural change lead to an
increase in consumption growth volatility relative to output. Section V concludes.
87
Chapter 3. Business cycle implications
Figure 3.2: Financial inclusion in emerging Latin America versus small open
economies
(a) Domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP
(b) Automated teller machines (ATMs) per 100,000 adults
(c) Account at a financial institution (% of adults)
Source: Global Findex Database 2014, World Bank
Notes: Countries in light green represent emerging countries in Latin America. Countries in
dark purple represent small open economies (SOE). Classification of countries follows García-
Cicco et al. (2010).
Emerging countries in Latin America: ARG: Argentina, BRA: Brazil, CHL: Chile, COL:
Colombia, MEX: Mexico, PER: Peru, URY: Uruguay, VEN: Venezuela.
Developed small open economies: AUS: Australia, AUT: Austria, BEL: Belgium, CAN:
Canada, DNK: Denmark, FIN: Finland, NLD: Netherlands, NZL: New Zealand, NOR: Norway,
PRT: Portugal, ESP: Spain, SWE: Sweden, CHE: Switzerland
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3.2 The general model
3.2.1 The household sector
We assume a continuum of infinitely-lived households, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
A fraction 1 − λ of households have access to an international financial market
where they can trade a non-contingent real bond. In addition, these households
have access to a competitive capital market where they can buy and sell physical
capital (which they accumulate and rent it to firms). We refer to this subset as
unconstrained households. The remaining fraction λ of households do not own
any assets nor have any liabilities; they just consume their current labor income.
We refer to them as rule-of-thumb consumers.
Unconstrained households
Let Cut and Lut represent consumption and leisure for unconstrained consumers.
Preferences are defined by the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) and the period utility
U(CRt , L
R
t ). These consumers seek to solve the following problem:
max
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cut , L
u
t ) (3.1)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
Cut + I
u
t − qtDut+1 ≤ Wthut + utKut −Dut − T ut (3.1a)
and the capital accumulation equation
Kut+1 = (1− δ)Kut + Iut −
φ
2
Kut
(
Kut+1
Kut
− µ
)2
(3.1b)
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Lut + h
u
t = 1 (3.1c)
Hence, at the beginning of the period the representative unconstrained
household receives labor income Wtht (where Wt denotes real wage), and income
from renting her capital holdings Kt to firms at (real) rental cost ut. Besides these
factor receipts in period t, the household pays taxes to the government T ut and
has access to a world capital market for noncontingent debt at price qt. At this
price, they can sell a promise to deliver one unit of goods at t + 1 and Dt+1 is
number of such promises issued. The household uses the sum of these four income
sources to finance consumption goods, investment and current debt payments. The
capital accumulation constraint indicates that there is a cost when adjusting the
capital stock. This is commonly used in business cycles of small open economies
in order to avoid excessive volatility of investment in response to variations in the
domestic-foreign interest rate differential.
Following both Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and CF, we assume GHH
preferences, i.e :
U(Ct, ht,Γt−1) =
(Ct − τΓt−1(ht)ω)1−σ
1− σ
We include Γt−1 in the period utility function U to allow for a balanced growth3.
For this type of preferences, a well-behaved steady state of the deterministic
linearized model requires β 1
q
= µσ.
The first order conditions for the household’s problem can be written as:
τΓt−1ω(hut )
ω−1 = Wt (3.2)
(
1 + φ
(
Kut+1
Kut
− µ
))
= EtΛt,t+1
(
ut+1 + 1− δ − φ
2
(
µ2 −
(
Kut+2
Kut+1
)2))
(3.3)
3Since supply of work hours is independent of consumption, the absence of Γt−1 would imply
non stationary hours. Benhabib et al. (1991) show that these preferences can be interpreted as
reduced form preferences for an economy with home production and technological progress in
the home production sector.
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qt = EtΛt,t+1 (3.4)
where Λt,t+k is the stochastic discount factor for real k-period ahead payoffs given
by
Λt,t+k ≡ βk
(
Cut+k − τΓt+k−1(hut+k)ω
Cut − τΓt−1(hut )ω
)−σ
(3.5)
Rule of thumb households
By definition, these households behave in a “hand-to-mouth” fashion; i.e., each
period they fully consume their labor income and government transfers if any.
While there may be several interpretations for rule of thumb consumers, one is
their lack of financial access and (continuously) binding borrowing constrains.
Other reasons are myopia, fear of saving and ignorance of intertemporal trading
opportunities. Each period they solve a static problem:
maxU(Crt , L
r
t )
s.t:
(3.6)
Crt ≤ Wthrt + T rt (3.6a)
Lrt + h
r
t = 1 (3.6b)
Preferences are symmetric to those of unconstrained households and their first
order condition is:
τΓt−1ω(hrt )
ω−1 = Wt (3.7)
Substituting hours in the budget constraint yields:
Crt = (τΓt−1ω)
−1
ω−1Wt
ω
ω−1 + T rt (3.8)
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Aggregation
Consumption good aggregate demand and hours aggregate supply are a
weighted average of individual demand and supply, respectively. Formally:
Ct ≡ λCrt + (1− λ)Cut (3.9)
hSt ≡ λhrt + (1− λ)hut (3.10)
Note, under symmetrically parameterized GHH preferences and homogenous
labor productivity, hrt = hut = hSt .
Similarly, aggregate investment, aggregate supply of capital stock and
aggregate debt stock:
It ≡ (1− λ)Iut (3.11)
KSt ≡ (1− λ)Kut (3.12)
Dt ≡ (1− λ)Dut (3.13)
Aggregate euler for investment (derivation in Appendix)
(
1 + φ
(
Kt+1
Kt
− µ
))
=
Etβ
(
Ct+1 − τΓthωt Ω− λT rt+1
Ct − τΓt−1hωt Ω− λT rt
)−σ(
ut+1 + 1− δ + φ
2
((
Kt+2
Kt+1
)2
− µ2
))
(3.14)
Aggregate euler for international bonds (derivation in Appendix)
qt = Etβ
(
Ct+1 − τΓthωt Ω− λT rt+1
Ct − τΓt−1hωt Ω− λT rt
)−σ
(3.15)
where Ω = λ(ω − 1) + 1
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3.2.2 Government
We assume the government runs a balanced budget period by period. Transfers
to rule of thumb households are financed by lump sum taxes collected from
unconstrained households.
(1− λ)T ut = λT rt
Transfers and taxes are exogenous variables in the model. Since we don’t allow
time variation of λ during the period and subperiods considered in the estimation
section, the ratio T rt /T ut also remains stable.
3.2.3 Firms
Firms are perfectly competitive. They hire labor ht and rent capital Kt to
produce the final good. Technology is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production
function:
Yt = AtKt
α(Γtht)
1−α (3.16)
where α is capital’s share of output, At is temporary productivity and Γt reflects
trend productivity. These two productivity processes are characterized by the
following stochastic properties:
ln
(
At
µA
)
= ρA
(
At−1
µA
)
+ At 
A
t ∼ N(0, σ2A) (3.17)
Γt = gtΓt−1 =
t∏
s=0
gs (3.18)
ln
(
gt
µ
)
= ρg
(
gt−1
µ
)
+ gt 
g
t ∼ N(0, σ2g) (3.19)
A positive realization of gt has a permanent effect on total productivity. In
what follows, we will loosely refer to the realizations of g as “growth shocks” as
93
Chapter 3. Business cycle implications
they constitute the stochastic trend of productivity.
To produce, firms need to borrow working capital at the beginning of the
period due to a friction in the technology for transferring resources to households
providing labor services. In order to transfer wage payments to workers firms
need to set aside a fraction θ of the wage bill at the beginning of the period and
a fraction (1− θ) at the end of the period. Because production becomes available
only at the end of the period, firms have to borrow θWtht units of goods (the
working capital) between the beginning and end of period t, at rate Rt−1.
There is no friction in the technology for transferring resources to households
that supply capital to firms. At the end of the period, once output becomes
available, firms pay wages (Wtht), rental fees to owners of capital (utKt) and
repay the working capital loan plus interest (θWthtRt−1). Each period they solve
a static problem:
maxYt −Wtht − utKt − (Rt−1 − 1)θWtht
s.t:
Yt = AtKt
α(Γtht)
1−α
(3.20)
The term (Rt−1 − 1)θWtht represents the net interest on the fraction of the
wage bill that was paid with borrowed funds.
First order conditions give capital demand and labor demand equations,
respectively
αAtKt
α−1(Γtht)
1−α = ut (3.21)
(1− α)AtKtα(Γtht)−αΓt = (1 + (Rt−1 − 1)θ)Wt (3.22)
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3.2.4 Market equilibrium
Given initial conditions on capital stock K−1, debt stock D−1, labor
augmenting productivity Γ−1 and sequences of real interest rates {Rt}∞−1, prices
for noncontingent debt {qt}∞0 , productivity {At}∞0 and growth shocks {gt}∞0 ,
an equilibrium is a sequence of allocations {Ct, ht, Dt+1, It, Kt+1} and of prices
{Wt, ut} such that
1. Allocations solve the firm’s and the household problem at the equilibrium
prices
2. Markets for inputs clear
A balanced growth path for the economy is an equilibrium in which Rt, At and
gt are constant. Along a balanced growth path ut, ht and qt are constant and all
other variables grow at rate µ.
Country’s net exports (NXt) is production net of working capital loan
payments and that are not spent in consumption or investment:
NXt = Yt − Ct − It = Dt − qtDt+1 + (Rt − 1)θ(1− α)
1 + (Rt − 1)θ Yt (3.23)
The aggregate resource constraint (derived in appendix)
Ct + It − qtDt+1 = Yt(1 + (Rt−1 − 1)θα)
1 + (Rt−1 − 1)θ −Dt (3.24)
Aggregate investment
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt + φ
2
Kt
(
Kt+1
Kt
− µ
)2
(3.25)
95
Chapter 3. Business cycle implications
3.2.5 Interest rates and country risk
As discussed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), since households face an
incomplete asset market and the rate of return is partly exogenously determined,
the steady state of the model depends on initial conditions; in particular, on net
foreign asset position. Put differently, the equilibrium dynamics are no longer
stationary. Therefore, serious computational difficulties arise.
To induce stationarity of the equilibrium dynamics we also follow CF by
choosing the technique of specifying a debt elastic interest rate premium p(.).
Interest on foreign borrowing is therefore specified as the sum of the real interest
rate and the premium:
1
qt
= Rt + p(.) (3.26)
with
p(Dt+1,Γt) = ψ
(
exp
(
Dt+1
Γt
− d
)
− 1
)
Note that in choosing the optimal amount of debt, households do not internalize
the fact that there is an upward-sloping supply of loans.
The real interest rate at which international investors are willing to lend to
the emerging economy has two sources of fluctuations: the perceived default risk
and international investors preferences for risky assets. As in Neumeyer and Perri
(2005), these two sources of fluctuations are captured by decomposing the interest
rate faced by the emerging economy as
Rt = StRt
∗ (3.27)
where R∗t is an international rate for risky assets (not specific to any emerging
economy) and St is the country spread paid by borrowers to international investors.
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The CF model assumes a simple country risk determination4. In their model as in
ours, expected total productivity - measured by Solow Residual - drives country
risk. Formally,
ln
(
St
S
)
= −ηEtln
(
SRt+1
SR
)
+ St 
S
t ∼ N(0, σ2S) (3.28)
where SRt+1 is the Solow residual. Under Cobb-Douglas production technology
with constant returns to scale
SRt = Atgt
1−α
Finally, the foreign rate of risky assets is modeled as a stochastic process
completely independent from domestic conditions
ln
(
R∗t
R∗
)
= ρrf ln
(
R∗t−1
R∗
)
+ R
∗
t 
R∗
t ∼ N(0, σ2rf ) (3.29)
3.3 Empirical approach
3.3.1 Does data support a model with limited credit market
participation?
Calibrated and estimated parameters
We estimate some parameters and calibrate others. The choice of which
parameters to estimate or calibrate is guided by our research interest. The
parameter λ is the most relevant object of estimation as it reflects the fraction of
rule of thumb households in the economy.
4This idea is based on models of default and incomplete markets in which default probabilities
are high when expectations of positive shocks to productivity are low. See Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) and Arellano (2008)
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In addition, we estimate exogenous processes for all shocks to productivity
(ρa, ρg, σa, σg) and to spread component (σS). We estimate the spread elasticity
to domestic fundamentals (η) and working capital requirement parameter (θ).
Introducing working capital requirement in production is useful to match the
volatility of output.
Following most papers we also estimate the parameter (φ) governing the capital
adjustment function and the long run yearly growth rate (ζ). Note that the
latter implies that the value of long run productivity quarterly growth µ will be
determined by posterior estimates of ζ, since µ = (ζ/100 + 1)1/4.
We calibrate the remaining parameters of the model. A period is taken to be
one quarter. Calibrated values are given in Table 3.1 and set at conventional values
following CF, Akinci (2014) and references therein. The coefficient of risk aversion
(σ) affecting the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to the conventional
value of 2. The parameters ω and τ are set so that labor supply elasticity equals
1.67 and the fraction of time spent working equals 1/3 in the long run, respectively.
The parameter α is set so that labor share of income is 0.68. Following CF
and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), the baseline value of debt to GDP ratio is set
to 10%.
Calibration of steady state interest rate and spread is based on corresponding
historical data, calculated as Uribe and Yue (2006) and described further in the
next subsection. Annualized foreign interest rate and country gross spreads are
set to 1.01 and 1.0081 respectively. We also choose to calibrate parameters related
to the foreign interest rate process (σrf and ρrf ) to match its standard deviation
and first order serial correlation for the sample period used (1995:II-2014:IV).
The quarterly depreciation rate is assumed to be 5% as in Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007) and CF. We set the elasticity of interest rates to debt (ψ) to a small value
and equal to 0.001. The main purpose of this parameter is to guarantee the
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equilibrium solution to be stationary.
Furthermore, note that a well behaved steady state of the deterministic
linearized model requires βR = µσ. As previously explained, long run productivity
quarterly growth µ is linked to the posterior distribution of ζ. Therefore the
bounds of the discount factor β (= µ
σ
Rss
), the calibrated steady state value of gross
domestic interest rate and the calibrated coefficient of risk aversion σ will impose
restrictions on the domain of ζ when we define its prior.
Finally, I calibrate the ratio of net transfers to gdp (γt) at 7.5%. Transfers as
% of GDP were extracted for Mexico from OECD (2014). The series correspond
to average annual social expenditures as % of GDP for the period 1990-2012. It
is the total of cash benefits and benefits in kind for all social policy areas (Active
labour market programmes, family, health etc).
Table 3.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Description Value
α Capital share of income 0.32
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.05
dyss Debt to GDP ratio 0.1
rfss Gross foreign interest rate 1.01
ψ Debt elastic interest rate parameter 0.001
µa Mean of Transitory Tech. process 1
γt Ratio net transfers/ GDP 0.075
σ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution (=1/σ) 2
ω Labor supply elasticity (1/(ω − 1) = 1.67) 1.6
rss Long run country interest rate 1.0182
sss Long run gross country interest rate premium 1.0081
τ Leisure preference parameter so that hss=1/3 1.75
σrf S.D of foreign interest rate shock (%) 0.588
ρrf AR(1) coef. Foreign interest rate process 0.96
Notes: The value used as σrf matches a foreign interest rate with a standard
deviation of 2.1% , given the calibrated value of ρrf .
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Table 3.2: Parameters linked to estimated parameters
Parameter Description Linked with Linking equation
µ Long run gross quarterly growth rate ζ µ = (ζ/100 + 1)1/4
β Discount factor ζ β = µ
σ
rss
Ω Parameter in aggregate Euler λ Ω = λ(ω − 1) + 1
Data and implementation
Observables
We retrieve aggregate series of final private consumption (C), gross fixed capital
formation (I) and the trade balance (TB) for Mexico from the OECD database.
All series are measured in national currency at constant prices (national base year)
and are seasonally adjusted. The output series (Y) used to estimate the extended
model is the sum of private final consumption, gross capital formation and the
trade balance. The initial sample for Mexican data covers the years 1993 to 2014
(quarterly frequency). We drop the period 1993:I-1995:I as it is common in the
literature on mexican business cycles; fluctuations during this period were mostly
driven by the Tequila crisis.
In addition, we use quarterly data of foreign risky interest rate and spreads.
We follow Uribe and Yue (2003) in constructing these series. We use real interest
rates in the US to calibrate the process of foreign risky interest rate and data on
spreads to estimate the extended model.
The real interest rate (r∗t ) for the US is constructed as the 3-month Treasury
Bill Secondary market rate (%) (TB3MS) minus a measure of expected annual
inflation. This measure is the average of annual inflation of 4 previous quarters
(including current).
r∗t = TB3MSt −
t∑
t−3
(ln(DEFt)− ln(DEFt−4))/4
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The price index used to calculate inflation is the GDP Implicit Price Deflator
(DEF). The inputs for constructing US real interest rate are extracted from FRED.
Country spreads are based on JP Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index
Plus (EMBI+) which tracks total returns for traded external debt instruments (i.e.
foreign currency denominated fixed income) in emerging markets. We download
from DATASTREAM, the JPM EMBI GLOBAL+ (stripped spread in basis points
/100 ) for Mexico.
Following CF, we estimate the model using log differences of C, I and Y and the
first difference of TBy. As García-Cicco et al. (2010) and CF pointed out, although
TBy has no trend, it is convenient to feed the model with its first differences when
fitting small open economy models. The reason is that these models typically
and counterfactually deliver a quasi random walk process in the trade balance
level inherited by the nature of the endowment process. The observables therefore
considered are
DATAt =
[
∆ln(Yt),∆ln(Ct),∆ln(It),∆TByt, ln(S¯t)
]
where: ∆ln(Yt) is real GDP growth, ∆ln(Ct) is real consumption growth, ∆ln(It)
is real Investment growth, ∆TByt is the first difference of trade balance to GDP
ratio and ln ¯(St) is log of gross spreads for Mexican bonds (demeaned)5. See
appendix for derivation of model counterpart of selected series.
Implementation and choice of priors
To sample from the posterior distribution, we implement a Random Walk
Metropolis Algorithm described in An and Schorfheide (2007). We make 4 million
5We demean a variable X in the following way :
ln(X¯t) = ln(Xt)−
T∑
t=0
ln(Xt)
T
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draws from posterior and burn the first 1 million draws6.
Regarding priors, we follow CF in several choices. For example, we choose a
considerable diffuse prior for φ since previous studies have found different values
when trying to mimic investment volatility. In addition we choose a similar
prior distribution for η and θ. We follow Akinci (2014) when setting the prior
distributions for parameters related to shock processes (ρa, σa, ρg, σg, σs)7.
However, we allow a higher mode when setting the prior of σa and σg in order
to align them better with those implied by priors in CF.
The choice of a prior distribution for our parameter of interest λ follows
similar previous studies. Bilbiie and Straub (2013) used a beta prior distribution
centered at 0.35 and with a standard deviation of 10% for the US supported by
previous empirical estimates. There is far less evidence on estimates for developing
countries. One paper is that of Vaidyanathan (1993). The author estimates λ
using aggregate data on consumption growth and output growth for a sample of
94 countries and found a mean of 0.6 for the southamerican sample. Ponce (2003)
estimated similar reduced form regressions for Mexico and his results suggest that
the fraction of rule of thumb in Mexico would be around 0.4. We choose to center
the prior at a mean of 0.4 and allow a relatively high dispersion of 10 %.
Since we have more observables (5) than structural shocks (4), we add
measurement error shocks for all our observables and estimate them. We assume
flat priors with a standard deviation not larger than 25% of each corresponding
series total standard deviation.
6Convergence analysis of chains (running means plot) can be sent upon request.
7We follow Akinci (2014) since CF assumes a Gamma prior distribution for the standard
deviation of technology and spread shocks
102
Chapter 3. Business cycle implications
Table 3.3: Prior distributions
Description Density Mean S.D (%) min max
λ Fraction of rule of thumb households Beta 0.4 10 0 1
ρa AR(1) transitory tech. process Beta 0.8 10 0.001 0.999
σa S.D of transitory tech. shock (%) Inv. Gamma 0.02 1.5 0.001 0.03
ρg AR(1) permanent tech. process Beta 0.8 10 0.001 0.999
σg S.D of permanent tech. shock (%) Inv. Gamma 0.02 1.5 0.001 0.03
η Spread elasticity Gamma 1 10 0.001 10
φ Capital adjustment cost parameter Gamma 40 500 1 100
σs S.D spread shock (%) Inv. Gamma 0.01 1.5 0.001 0.02
θ Working cap. requirement Beta 0.5 10 0 1
ζ Long run yearly growth rate (%) Gamma 2.5 20 0 3.6
σγYme S.D (%) measurement error in γY Uniform 0.15 0.63 0.01 0.28
σγCme S.D (%) measurement error in γC Uniform 0.28 2.47 0.01 0.55
σγIme S.D (%) measurement error in γI Uniform 0.32 3.22 0.01 0.63
σdTbyme S.D (%) measurement error in dTby Uniform 0.10 0.25 0.01 0.18
σSme S.D (%) measurement error in S Uniform 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.15
Posterior estimates
Estimated posterior distributions of the parameters of both restricted and
unrestricted models are summarized in Table 3.4. Figure 3.3 plots priors and
posterior distributions for the unrestricted model and figure 3.4 for the restricted
model.
The most important result is that related to the posterior distribution of the
fraction of rule of thumb households (λ). Data is very informative regarding our
key parameter of interest; the posterior distribution is to the right of its prior. The
parameter λ in our model would represent households with no savings nor access to
(or demand of) consumption loans. Its posterior median is 0.754 and this estimate
is aligned with financial exclusion measures derived from household surveys in
Mexico. The National Report of Financial Inclusion in Mexico (CONAIF, 2016)
provides evidence that in 2011, 73 % of adults in Mexico not only didn’t have any
account (savings, deposits etc) in a financial institution, but also spent at least all
their income and therefore have not saved during the previous 12 months of the
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survey.
Several other results are also worth mentioning.
First, data seems very informative when estimating both versions. The
estimated posteriors for almost all parameters appear much more precise than
the priors. However, data has little to say about the long run annual growth
parameter ζ which basically reproduces the prior. Unlike CF and García-Cicco
et al. (2010), we are able to identify the parameter ρg which is a key parameter
when assessing the importance of trend shocks relative to transitory shocks.
Second, trend shocks seem dominant in both versions. To asses the importance
of trend shocks, we use the measure derived in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)
expressed below. This measure is derived from recognizing the Solow residual (in
logs) implied by the model log(SRt) = log(At) + (1− α)log(Γt) can be rewritten
as the sum of a random walk component τt and a transitory component st. Then,
a measure of the importance of trend shocks is the variance of the random walk
component ∆τ relative to the overall variance in ∆log(SR). As Table 3.4 shows,
in the model of limited credit market participation (λ ≥ 0), the implied RWC
calculated at the median, mode and mean of the relevant parameters seem far
above the values found under the restricted version (λ = 0).
RWC =
(1−α)2
(1−ρg)2σ
2
g
2
(1+ρa)
σ2a +
(1−α)2
(1−ρ2g)σ
2
g
Third, the parameters related to financial frictions appear quite significantly
different than zero. The tight posterior distribution of η, with a median of
approximately 0.86 is robust when restricting the model and is fairly close to
the estimates in CF. This result reveals a significant elasticity of the spread to
expected fluctuations in the Solow residual. The posterior median, mode and
mean values of the parameter θ governing working capital requirement are also
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robust when restricting the model and are found to be lower than those found in
CF. While in CF the posterior distribution shifts right relative to the prior, here
it shifts left. This may be indicating a decline in this parameter, since we are
including a more recent period than in CF.
Finally, the estimated values of the capital adjustment cost parameter φ differ
across the restricted and unrestricted model. One interpretation is that even if λ
has no effect on investment dynamics per se (as evidenced in the aggregate euler
for capital), when there are rule of thumb households in the economy, a higher
relevance of trend shocks relative to transitory shocks is needed to match the data.
Therefore, capturing investment dynamics in the presence of limited credit market
participation requires higher capital adjustment costs.
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Figure 3.3: Posterior estimates of the unrestricted model (λ ≥ 0)
Figure 3.4: Posterior estimates of the restricted model (λ = 0)
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Model evaluation
a) Marginal data densities
Table 3.5 reports standard measures of predictive accuracy: log values of
the likelihood, the posterior -both computed at the posterior mode- and model
comparison based on posterior odds (marginal data density). The last measure
captures the relative one-step ahead predictive performance. All measures suggest
that the unrestricted model outperforms the restricted version.
Table 3.5: Model comparison. Period 1995:II-2014:IV
Restricted model (λ = 0) Unrestricted model (λ ≥ 0)
Log posterior at mode 1157.26 1203.80
Log likelihood at mode 1149.49 1205.22
Log marginal data density 1083.86 1123.83
Notes: The log marginal data densities are computed based on Geweke (1999) modified
harmonic mean with truncation parameter 0.5. Results hold when used different
truncation values.
b) Matching moments
Another metric to evaluate the relative merits of alternative models is the
comparison on how well model implied moments fit those observed by data.
Results are gathered in Table 3.6 where sample moments of the data, in terms
of standard deviation, serial correlation and cross correlation with output growth
are compared to the theoretical moments implied by median estimates from the
two models. Regarding its ability to match observed standard deviations, the
unrestricted model does a better job at matching volatility of all series but one
(spreads). Note the main difference across implied standard deviations is at the
series of consumption growth and the trade balance ratio.
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Table 3.6: Matching moments at median estimates. Period 1995:II-2014:IV
γY γC γI dTby S
Standard deviation (%)
Data 1.112 1.211 2.531 0.787 0.615
Restricted model (λ = 0) 1.017 2.663 3.588 2.575 0.780
Unrestricted model (λ ≥ 0) 1.034 1.290 3.125 1.015 0.902
Serial correlation
Data 0.390 0.396 0.324 0.053 0.778
Restricted model (λ = 0) 0.119 0.054 -0.005 -0.082 0.766
Unrestricted model (λ ≥ 0) 0.165 0.145 0.000 -0.093 0.826
Correlation with γY
Data 1.000 0.746 0.649 0.053 -0.036
Restricted model (λ = 0) 1.000 0.507 0.316 -0.052 -0.434
Unrestricted model (λ ≥ 0) 1.000 0.952 0.414 -0.084 -0.448
Contrasting variance decomposition results across models
We assess the role of each exogenous shock by computing the variance
decomposition implied by both the unrestricted and restricted models at their
median estimates and over a time horizon of 40 quarters.
Table 3.7 suggests that approximately 27% of gdp growth variance and 25% of
consumption growth variance is driven by shocks to the trend when the fraction
of financially excluded households is not restricted to zero. When there are no
rule of thumb consumers in the economy, these percentages decrease to 17%
and 13.9%, respectively. The inclusion of λ in the estimation, enhances the
contribution of non stationary technology shocks on consumption growth volatility
by approximately 10 percentage points. Same directional change but at a much
lower scale is observed for stationary technology shocks. The inclusion of λ in the
estimation, rises the contribution of stationary technology shocks on consumption
growth volatility by 3 percentage points. Finally, the unrestricted model decreases
substantially the contribution of the world interest rate on the volatility of all
observables, particularly of consumption and output.
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Table 3.7: Variance decomposition predicted by model. Period 1995:II-2014:IV
γY γC γI dTby S
Predicted by Restricted Model (λ = 0)
Nonstationary technology σg 0.171 0.139 0.072 0.018 0.242
World Interest rate σR 0.788 0.820 0.911 0.981 0.000
Stationary technology σz 0.041 0.041 0.017 0.001 0.665
Exogenous spread σS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.093
Predicted by Unrestricted Model (λ ≥ 0)
Nonstationary technology σg 0.275 0.257 0.140 0.022 0.256
World Interest rate σR 0.660 0.671 0.825 0.976 0.000
Stationary technology σz 0.064 0.071 0.035 0.002 0.678
Exogenous spread σS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.066
Notes: The estimated contribution of measurement errors (not shown) is negligible for
all five variables
3.4 The predicted macroeconomic effect of a rise
in credit market participation in an emerging
economy
Given our results from the previous section, this section conducts impulse
response analyses to illustrate the intuition on the role of an increase in credit
market participation in an emerging economy. Figure 3.5 presents the impulse
responses of our key macro aggregates to a 1 standard deviation shock on non
stationary productivity, foreign interest rate and stationary productivity. The
continuous line depicts the responses after setting parameters at their median
estimates. The dashed line illustrates the counterfactual responses if there is a
higher credit market participation (λ = 0.3) in this economy.
The first column in 3.5 plots the responses (deviation from steady state)
to a one standard deviation positive shock in the foreign risky rate (Rt ). On
impact, consumption of unconstrained households suffers a decrease proportional
to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Given that the working capital
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requirement links current labor demand with the predetermined interest rate,
output doesn’t change on impact. However, labor demand decreases in the
subsequent period, leading to a further decrease of aggregate consumption. In
addition, the decrease in expected marginal productivity of capital yields a
reduction of investment on impact. As output responds less and more slowly to
the shock on the real interest rate relative to both Consumption and Investment,
there is a trade surplus.
The second column in 3.5 illustrates the responses of one standard deviation
impulse in the temporary productivity component. A positive productivity shock
increases marginal product of inputs and labor demand increases. Given GHH
preferences, an increase in labor demand induces a movement along the labor
supply curve and an increase of hours (and output) in equilibrium. Foreign
lenders perceive a lower probability of default and therefore real interest rate
declines. Unconstrained households have a temporary increase in income which
leads them to increase savings in order to smooth consumption through a PIH
reasoning. However, the decrease in real interest rates provides these households
stronger incentives to consume and consumption rises a bit more than output.
This translates in a trade deficit.
The last column illustrates a one standard deviation shock in growth (gt ).
A positive growth shock increases marginal product of inputs and labor demand
increases; thus hours and output rise on impact. As before, foreign lenders perceive
a lower probability of default in the economy and real interest rate declines.
Households observe an increasing profile of income and the unconstrained ones
increase consumption beyond current income. Furthermore, the decrease in real
interest rates provides these type of households further reasons to incur in debt.
The key message delivered by the dashed line responses is that for all
shocks, a lower fraction λ of rule of thumb households (rise in credit market
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participation), would amplify the response of consumption and the trade balance
ratio, ceteris paribus. That is, as more households gain access to credit, volatility
of consumption and the trade balance in this emerging economy will tend
to increase regardless of the relative contribution of each exogenous shock in
aggregate fluctuations.
Figure 3.5: Impulse response functions
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3.4.1 The role of financial frictions
To examine the role of financial frictions on the relationship between credit
market participation and aggregate volatility in an emerging economy, we perform
the following exercises.
First, we derive new impulse responses by fixing all parameters at their
corresponding median but setting both η (spread elasticity) and θ (working capital
requirement) to zero. We do so to compare them with impulse responses derived
under financial frictions.
Figure 3.6 illustrates that an increase of credit market participation still
amplifies the response of consumption and the trade balance ratio to each
corresponding shock. The key difference lies in the impulse response functions
of temporary productivity shocks. First, without financial frictions, we fail to
deliver a countercyclical trade balance. Second, since the real interest rate is
now constant, unconstrained households have no incentives to incur in debt. As
more households become unconstrained, more households would be able to smooth
income fluctuations through savings and aggregate volatility of consumption would
decrease, ceteris paribus. The impulse response analysis suggests that the effect
of a rise in credit market participation on volatility of consumption in an economy
with no financial frictions would depend on the relative relevance of each of these
structural shocks on aggregate fluctuations.
Second, we derive the unconditional volatility of output, consumption,
investment and trade balance implied by the model at different combinations of
the fraction of rule of thumb households (λ) and parameters controlling financial
frictions.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse response functions assuming no financial frictions
Figure 3.7 plots the unconditional volatility of key macro aggregates for
different combinations of the fraction of rule of thumb households (λ) and the
spread elasticity (η). All other parameters remain fixed at median estimates of the
unrestricted model. The graph shows that while output and investment growth are
more sensitive to η than λ, consumption growth and the first difference of the trade
balance ratio are more sensitive to λ. The main message is that given the degree of
financial frictions (measured here by η), as financial exclusion decreases (↓ λ) and
a greater percentage of households can smooth income fluctuations, volatility of
both consumption and the trade balance increases. The second key observation is
that the lesser financial frictions are ( ↓ η), the lower is the unconditional volatility
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of output, consumption and investment growth.
Figure 3.7: Unconditional standard deviation of key macroeconomic aggregates at
different λ and η combinations
(a) Output growth (b) Consumption growth
(c) Investment growth (d) Trade balance ratio (first difference)
Notes: Remaining parameters are fixed at median estimates of unrestricted model
Figure 3.8 illustrates how unconditional volatilities change for different
combinations of λ and the parameter controlling working capital requirements
(θ). Similar results emerge. As financial exclusion decreases without any other
improvement of financial conditions, consumption growth volatility will tend to
increase in an emerging market.
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Figure 3.8: Unconditional standard deviation of key macroeconomic aggregates at
different λ and θ combinations
(a) Output growth (b) Consumption growth
(c) Investment growth (d) Trade balance ratio (first difference)
Notes: Remaining parameters are fixed at median estimates of unrestricted model
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3.5 Rising credit market participation in Mexico
and its effect on aggregate fluctuations
3.5.1 Splitting the full sample in two subperiods
We first proceed by splitting the sample in two subperiods: 1995:II - 2004:IV
(39 quarters) and 2005:I- 2014:4 (40 quarters). We choose 2005 as the beginning
of the second subperiod since figure 3.9a suggests that financial depth measured
by domestic credit to private sector (as % of GDP) started to rise significantly
around 2005. The choice for splitting the sample is also aligned with the
findings by Hansen and Sulla (2013) who find that domestic credit to private
sector increased significantly from 2004 to 2011 in most latin american countries
(including Mexico). Figure 3.9b supports that most of the rise was driven by
consumption credit growth.
Figure 3.9: Evolution of private credit in Mexico
(a) Domestic credit to private sector as %
GDP
(b) Credit by type as % of domestic credit to
private sector
Sources: World Bank Global Financial database. Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores de
Mexico.
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3.5.2 Calibration and priors
We keep stable the calibration of all parameters except that used to match
the standard deviation of the foreign interest rate process (σrf ). The reason to
not keep it stable is supported by Figure 3.10. The value used as σrf for the first
and second subperiod matches a foreign interest rate with a standard deviation of
1.96% and 1.3% respectively.
Since splitting the sample reduces significantly the sample size, we choose to
calibrate the AR(1) coefficients in the transitory and the permanent technology
processes, financial frictions parameters (θ and η) and the long run yearly growth
rate ζ. The calibrated values are set at the median of the correspondent posterior
distribution from the full sample estimation. Table 3.8 summarizes the calibration
chosen for each subperiod. The list of estimated parameters is therefore restricted
to 10: λ, σa, σg, φ, σS and standard deviations of all five measurement errors. We
use the same prior distributions as those described earlier when estimating the full
sample.
Figure 3.10: Interest rate data
Notes: Rf is gross real interest rate for the US, constructed using data from FRED. Spreads
is JP Morgan’s EMBI Global + index for Mexico, downloaded from DATASTREAM. Rdom is
gross real domestic interest rate for Mexico, constructed following Uribe and Yue (2003).
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Table 3.8: Calibration by subperiod
Parameter Description First Period SecondPeriod
1995:II-2004:IV 2005:I-2014:4
α Capital share of income 0.32 0.32
δ Depreciation rate of capital 0.05 0.05
dyss Debt to GDP ratio 0.1 0.1
rfss Gross foreign interest rate 1.01 1.01
ψ Debt elastic interest rate parameter 0.001 0.001
µa Mean of Transitory Tech. process 1 1
γt Ratio net transfers/ GDP 0.075 0.075
σ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution (=1/σ) 2 2
ω Labor supply elasticity (1/(ω − 1) = 1.67) 1.6 1.6
rss Long run country interest rate 1.018 1.018
sss Long run gross country interest rate premium 1.008 1.008
τ Leisure preference parameter so that hss=1/3 1.757 1.757
ρa AR(1) transitory tech. process 0.920 0.920
ρg AR(1) permanent tech. process 0.800 0.800
η Spread elasticity 0.840 0.840
θ Capital work. Requirement 0.360 0.360
ζ Long run yearly growth rate (%) 2.530 2.530
ρrf AR(1) coef. Foreign interest rate process 0.960 0.960
σrf S.D of foreign interest rate shock (%) 0.550 0.364
3.5.3 Posterior estimates
The posterior distributions of key parameters and for each subperiod are
illustrated in Figure 3.11 and summarized in Table 3.9. As it can be inferred from
the non overlapping credible sets, the estimated value for λ across subperiods is
significantly different.
Whereas in the first subperiod of 1995-2004, median estimates suggest that
around 72% of total households had a behavior consistent with rule of thumb
consumers, during the most recent decade 2005-2014, that fraction fell to around
49%. Conversely, the fraction of total households participating in the credit market
and able to smooth income fluctuations in Mexico reached 51% in the recent
decade; that is, an increase of 23 percentage points.
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The significant rise in the number of households smoothing income fluctuations,
is aligned with the observed trend of financial sector outreach measures derived
for Mexico and proposed by The World Bank in Beck et al. (2005). As argued
by the authors, measures of bank penetration (both geographic and demographic)
closely predict harder-to-collect micro-level statistics of households. In addition,
due to lack of household surveys with information on use of financial services,
there are no other financial inclusion indicators for Mexico that date back to 2005
or earlier. The first National Financial Inclusion Report (CNBV, 2009), finds that
the number of bank branches per 1,000 km2 increased from 3.61 in 2001 to 5.06 in
2009 and the number of bank branches per 100 people increased from 73 in 2001
to 93 in 2009. In addition to their upward trend, both measures experienced a
significant increase on their annual compounded growth rate at the beginning of
2006. The other main conclusion that emerges from the estimation results is that
no other parameter changed significantly across subperiods.
Figure 3.11: Posterior estimates by subperiod
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Variance decomposition analysis
We do a variance decomposition analysis calculated over a time horizon of
40 quarters for each subperiod and compare the role of each shock on aggregate
volatility.
Table 3.10 suggests that in the first decade of 1995 to 2004 the world interest
rate was the main driver of aggregate fluctuations, explaining around 63 % of real
gdp and consumption fluctuations. In the recent decade from 2005 to 2014, non
stationary technology shocks were the main driver, explaining around 50 % of
total variance in same aggregate series as above.
Table 3.10: Variance decomposition predicted by subperiod estimates.
γY γC γI dTby S
Predicted by first subperiod median estimates (1995:II-2004:IV)
Nonstationary technology σg 0.262 0.267 0.119 0.042 0.231
World Interest rate σR 0.641 0.630 0.820 0.951 0.000
Stationary technology σz 0.098 0.103 0.062 0.007 0.690
Exogenous spread σS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.079
Predicted by second subperiod median estimates (2005:I-2014:IV)
Nonstationary technology σg 0.507 0.495 0.328 0.116 0.229
World Interest rate σR 0.337 0.332 0.556 0.861 0.000
Stationary technology σz 0.155 0.173 0.116 0.023 0.703
Exogenous spread σS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068
Notes: The estimated contribution of measurement errors (not shown) is
negligible for all five variables
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3.5.4 Isolating the role of a rise in credit market
participation on busines cycles for the recent decade.
During the recent decade 2005-2014, the Mexican economy faced a less volatile
foreign risky interest rate and less volatile spreads. Table 3.11 shows standard
deviations for key macroeconomic series across subperiods.
Relative to the previous decade, the recent subperiod 2005-2014 is also
associated with:
1. An increase of 0.29 percentage points in GDP growth (γY ) volatility.
2. A decrease of 1.72 in the ratio of standard deviation in investment growth
to standard deviation in gdp growth (γI/γY ).
3. An increase of 0.20 in the ratio of standard deviation in consumption growth
to standard deviation in gdp growth (γC/γY ).
4. An increase of 0.14 percentage points in trade balance ratio (dTby)
volatility.
Remember that our calibration and estimates presented in the previous subsection
reflect two key differences emerging across subperiods: a rise in credit market
participation and a decrease in the volatility of the foreign risky interest rate
process.
To illustrate the role of a rise in credit market participation on aggregate
fluctuations we need to isolate it from the change in the foreign risky interest rate
process. For this purpose we conduct the following experiment.
We start by illustrating the effect of a reduction in volatility of foreign interest
rate process by keeping all other parameters of baseline scenario fixed. The
baseline scenario uses the calibration and implied median estimates of the first
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subperiod (1995-2004). The observed decrease in volatility of the foreign interest
rate, lowers the volatility of all aggregate series, mainly γI/γY (reduced by 0.67)
followed by dTby (reduced by 0.36).
Next, we replicate a rise in credit market participation by 23 percentage points-
as implied by second subperiod estimates of λ- and keep all other parameters of
baseline scenario fixed (including the volatility of foreign interest rate). This
estimated increase in credit market participation would per se increase the ratio
γC/γY by 0.34 and dTby by 0.44 percentage points.
Putting both structural changes together, the model is able to generate:
1. A relatively stable volatility of γY .
2. A decrease of 0.68 in the ratio of volatilities γI/γY .
3. An increase of 0.25 in the ratio of volatilities γC/γY .
4. A relatively stable dTby.
Finally, allowing all parameters to be reestimated using second subperiod data,
we are able to move closer to second subperiod data. Even though we are far from
matching a 0.29 increase in the volatility of γY , we at least generate the desired
directional change. We are also able to decrease by more the ratio of volatilities
γI/γY , moving closer to what is implied by data.
The key message of this exercise can be split in three parts. First and foremost,
a rise in credit market participation is crucial to deliver a higher ratio of volatility
of consumption growth relative to volatility of GDP growth. In addition, it moves
us closer to data because it increases the volatility of the trade balance ratio amid
a less volatile interest rate environment. Second, a lower volatility of the foreign
interest rate is crucial to yield a less volatile investment growth relative to GDP
growth and to discipline down the volatility of the trade balance ratio. Third,
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reestimating the model is able to generate more volatility in GDP growth without
changing the main results.
Table 3.11: Implied standard deviations at median estimates by subperiod
γY γC/γY γI/γY dTby S R
f
Period 1995:II-2004:IV
Data 0.959 0.955 3.189 0.708 0.674 1.961
Model 1.162 1.255 3.167 1.162 1.044 1.961
Period 2005:I-2014:4
Data 1.248 1.152 1.466 0.852 0.150 1.301
Model 1.209 1.505 2.175 1.074 1.120 1.301
Table 3.12: Rising credit market participation in Mexico and implied standard
deviations
γY ∆
∗∗ γC/γY ∆∗∗ γI/γY ∆∗∗ dTby ∆∗∗
Data subperiod 1995-2004 0.96 0.96 3.19 0.71
Data subperiod 2005-2014 1.25 0.29 1.15 0.20 1.47 -1.72 0.85 0.14
Baseline model∗ 1.16 1.25 3.17 1.16
Baseline + new λ 1.16 0.00 1.60 0.34 3.14 -0.02 1.60 0.44
Baseline + new σ(Rf ) 1.13 -0.03 1.24 -0.01 2.50 -0.67 0.81 -0.36
Baseline + new λ + new σ(Rf ) 1.13 -0.03 1.51 0.25 2.48 -0.68 1.12 -0.04
Reestimated model 1.21 0.05 1.51 0.25 2.18 -0.99 1.07 -0.09
Notes:
∗ Baseline model uses median estimates from the first subperiod estimation. New λ is baseline but
setting λ to the median estimate for second subperiod (0.493). New σ(rf) is baseline but setting
the calibration of foreign interest rate standard deviation to value observed for second subperiod
(0.364). Reestimated model uses median estimates from the second subperiod estimation.
∗∗ Change (∆) implied by data is relative to first subperiod. Change implied at different
parameterizations is relative to baseline.
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3.6 Robustness check
3.6.1 Estimating financial frictions parameters
This section checks whether main results change when instead of calibrating
parameters reflecting financial frictions (θ and η), we estimate them. As before, we
choose to calibrate the AR(1) coefficients in both the transitory technology process
and the permanent technology process and the long run yearly growth rate ζ. In
addition, we calibrate the standard deviation in both the transitory technology
process (σa) and the permanent technology process (σg). The calibrated values are
set at the median of the correspondent posterior distribution from the full sample
estimation.Table 3.13 summarizes the calibration chosen. We use the same prior
distributions as those described earlier when estimating the full sample.
Table 3.13: Additional calibrated values by subperiod
Parameter Description First Period SecondPeriod
1995:II-2004:IV 2005:I-2014:4
ρa AR(1) transitory tech. process 0.920 0.920
ρg AR(1) permanent tech. process 0.800 0.800
σa S.D transitory tech. shock (%) 0.351 0.351
σg S.D permanent tech. shock (%) 0.477 0.477
ζ Long run yearly growth rate (%) 2.530 2.530
ρrf AR(1) coef. Foreign interest rate process 0.960 0.960
σrf S.D of foreign interest rate shock (%) 0.550 0.364
Estimation results reported in Table 3.14 once more suggest that 72% of total
households had a behavior consistent with rule of thumb consumers in the first
subperiod of 1995-2004 and that the fraction fell to around 48% during the most
recent decade 2005-2014. As before, no other parameter - i.e financial frictions (θ
and η) spread shocks, capital adjustment cost parameter φ - seemed that changed
significantly across subperiods.
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3.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter examines the business cycle implications of a rise in household
credit market participation in an emerging market. To address this question,
we allowed an exogenous fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers to coexist with
households that are able to smooth income fluctuations in an otherwise standard
RBC model for emerging economies.
The extended model is taken to aggregate data of Mexico and measures of
predictive accuracy suggest that it outperforms the more restricted standard
version. The estimation results suggest that the structural increase in credit
market participation by households lead to an increase in the volatility of both
consumption growth relative to output and the trade balance ratio during the
recent decade 2005-2014.
In general, the presence of financial frictions is the main mechanism by
which rising credit market participation will unambiguously increase aggregate
consumption volatility in an emerging economy. Under no financial frictions, the
relationship will depend on the variance decomposition of total factor productivity
into exogenous fluctuations in the trend versus transitory component.
The key message of this paper is that as more households participate in
consumption credit markets in emerging countries, a greater need of improving
broad financial development measures arise. We find that a simultaneous reduction
of the level of financial frictions would dampen the positive effect of lower financial
exclusion on consumption and trade balance volatility.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics for full sample of developing and emerging
countries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Std(∆ c) overall 4.00 3.64 0.25 30.77 N = 192
between 2.93 0.66 15.50 n = 52
within 2.39 -3.04 19.27 T-bar = 3.7
GINI overall 43.55 10.52 21.97 74.33 N = 192
between 10.52 26.38 66.52 n = 52
within 2.44 36.04 52.12 T-bar = 3.7
SH5to3 overall 3.81 1.58 1.92 14.33 N = 192
between 1.55 2.10 10.01 n = 52
within 0.53 1.17 8.14 T-bar = 3.7
SH234 overall 44.52 6.55 20.27 54.95 N = 192
between 6.58 26.32 54.10 n = 52
within 1.55 38.47 49.70 T-bar = 3.7
SH23 overall 23.75 4.96 8.29 32.98 N = 192
between 4.99 12.02 31.45 n = 52
within 1.14 20.03 27.79 T-bar = 3.7
PRIVY overall 39.72 29.99 2.17 148.31 N = 189
between 27.23 6.97 130.43 n = 51
within 11.20 13.41 74.36 T-bar = 3.7
M2 overall 48.17 28.07 10.75 158.98 N = 192
between 24.67 15.51 120.04 n = 52
within 10.96 -4.38 92.05 T-bar = 3.7
BANKDY overall 34.65 22.67 4.36 114.58 N = 183
between 20.39 4.60 103.35 n = 51
within 7.78 9.20 60.15 T-bar = 3.7
FINDY overall 35.24 22.89 4.36 114.58 N = 183
between 20.66 4.60 103.35 n = 51
within 7.67 9.79 57.12 T-bar = 3.7
LIQY overall 43.86 27.73 4.52 147.68 N = 183
between 24.36 4.77 112.85 n = 51
within 10.17 -1.81 85.87 T-bar = 3.7
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics for restricted sample: Latin American countries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
Std(∆ c) overall 4.64 4.27 0.25 30.77 N = 111
between 3.04 0.98 13.13 n = 20
within 3.06 -2.17 22.27 T-bar = 5.55
GINI overall 51.41 5.27 40.08 59.69 N = 78
between 4.92 41.44 58.12 n = 20
within 2.10 44.31 55.78 T-bar = 3.9
SH5to3 overall 4.59 0.86 3.00 6.45 N = 79
between 0.81 3.09 5.95 n = 20
within 0.32 3.74 5.27 T-bar = 3.95
SH234 overall 40.37 3.78 33.73 48.00 N = 79
between 3.60 35.08 47.87 n = 20
within 1.33 37.51 43.77 T-bar = 3.95
SH23 overall 20.32 2.57 15.67 26.02 N = 79
between 2.41 16.70 25.19 n = 20
within 1.00 18.42 23.12 T-bar = 3.95
PRIVY overall 34.30 18.53 10.72 94.63 N = 111
between 15.31 18.15 71.33 n = 20
within 10.44 10.91 70.17 T-bar = 5.55
M2 overall 36.76 15.18 11.01 83.52 N = 111
between 11.37 17.93 61.56 n = 20
within 10.01 4.45 63.74 T-bar = 5.55
BANKDY overall 25.90 13.88 3.21 76.40 N = 105
between 11.17 5.33 54.63 n = 19
within 8.10 5.54 48.02 T-bar = 5.52632
FINDY overall 26.43 14.45 3.21 76.40 N = 105
between 11.80 5.33 54.63 n = 19
within 8.15 6.07 48.56 T-bar = 5.52632
LIQY overall 30.53 15.01 4.00 80.23 N = 105
between 12.02 6.36 58.24 n = 19
within 8.79 8.00 56.02 T-bar = 5.52632
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Figure A.1: Marginal effects of inequality indicators conditional to BANKDY as
proxy for financial development
(a) GINI (b) SH5TO3
(c) SH234 (d) SH23
Notes: The proxy for financial development in this graph is Bank deposits over GDP
(BANKDY). GINI is the World Bank estimate of the Gini index in the scale of 0 to 100.
SH5TO3 is income share held by fifth quintile over income share held by third quintile of
income distribution. SH234 is income share held by second,third and fourth quintile of income
distribution. SH23 is income share held by second and third quintile of income distribution.
Controls included in the regression model are evaluated at means and shaded area is 90 %
confidence interval. Each subfigure represents the effect of an unit increase on the correspondent
inequality indicator on the standard deviation of real consumption per capita annual growth
over a 5 year period. For example: an increase of one point in the GINI index (say from 50 to
51) is associated with a larger decline in volatility at lower levels of BANKDY. As BANKDY
increases this marginal effect becomes less negative. At levels above the 50% a marginal increase
in the GINI index is associated with an increase in volatility.
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Figure A.2: Marginal effects of inequality indicators conditional to LIQY as proxy
for financial development
(a) GINI (b) SH5TO3
Notes: The proxy for financial development in this graph is Liquid liabilities to GDP (LIQY).
GINI is the World Bank estimate of the Gini index in the scale of 0 to 100. SH5TO3 is income
share held by fifth quintile over income share held by third quintile of income distribution.
Controls included in the regression model are evaluated at means and shaded area is 90 %
confidence interval. Each subfigure represents the effect of an unit increase on the correspondent
inequality indicator on the standard deviation of real consumption per capita annual growth
over a 5 year period. For example: an increase of one point in the GINI index (say from 50 to
51) is associated with a larger decline in volatility at lower levels of LIQY. As LIQY increases
this marginal effect becomes less negative. At levels above the 50% a marginal increase in the
GINI index is associated with an increase in volatility.
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Figure A.3: Marginal effects of inequality indicators conditional to PRIVY as
proxy for financial development
(a) SH234 (b) SH23
Notes: The proxy for financial development in this graph is Domestic credit to the private
sector as percentage of GDP (PRIVY). SH234 is income share held by second,third and fourth
quintile of income distribution. SH23 is income share held by second and third quintile of income
distribution. Controls included in the regression model are evaluated at means and shaded area
is 90 % confidence interval. Each subfigure represents the effect of an unit increase on the
correspondent inequality indicator on the standard deviation of real consumption per capita
annual growth over a 5 year period. For example: an increase of one point in SH234 (say from
50 to 51 %) is associated with a larger increase in volatility at lower levels of PRIVY. As PRIVY
increases this marginal effect decreases. At very high levels of PRIVY a marginal increase in
SH234 may potentially decrease volatility.
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Figure A.4: Marginal effects of inequality indicators conditional to M2 as proxy
for financial development
(a) SH234 (b) SH23
Notes: The proxy for financial development in this graph is the ratio M2 over GDP (M2).
SH234 is income share held by second,third and fourth quintile of income distribution. SH23
is income share held by second and third quintile of income distribution. Controls included in
the regression model are evaluated at means and shaded area is 90 % confidence interval. Each
subfigure represents the effect of an unit increase on the correspondent inequality indicator on
the standard deviation of real consumption per capita annual growth over a 5 year period. For
example: an increase of one point in SH234 (say from 50 to 51 %) is associated with a larger
increase in volatility at lower levels of M2. As M2 increases this marginal effect decreases. At
levels of M2 above the 60 % of GDP, a marginal increase in SH234 may potentially decrease
volatility.
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Table A.8: GINI and consumption growth volatility with latin american dummy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PRIVY M2 BANKDY FINDY LIQY
lgdppc 2.304 1.333 5.202* 5.490* 0.0923
[2.740] [4.563] [2.806] [2.770] [4.515]
pop 1.082 0.210 0.906 1.040 -0.632
[1.557] [2.236] [2.233] [2.099] [1.901]
trade 2.257 2.080 3.260 3.324 2.368
[2.517] [2.353] [2.329] [2.321] [1.934]
gov 0.00661 -0.772 -2.617 -2.544 -1.987
[3.018] [2.765] [1.790] [1.749] [2.551]
GINI -0.352** -0.379** -0.385*** -0.388*** -0.401***
[0.175] [0.187] [0.129] [0.128] [0.130]
FINDEV -0.109 -0.201 -0.378*** -0.373*** -0.328**
[0.198] [0.139] [0.115] [0.111] [0.134]
GINIxFINDEV 0.00240 0.00438 0.00869*** 0.00853*** 0.00690*
[0.00435] [0.00332] [0.00275] [0.00270] [0.00346]
Hansen statistic 15.79 16.74 10.03 9.990 13.37
Hansen d.f. 14 14 14 14 14
p-value of Hansen 0.326 0.270 0.760 0.763 0.498
AR(2) test statistic 0.777 0.114 -0.472 -0.413 -1.340
p-value of AR(2) 0.437 0.909 0.637 0.679 0.180
Number of instruments 27 27 27 27 27
Countries 51 52 51 51 51
N 189 192 186 186 186
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.9: SH5TO3 and consumption growth volatility with latin american
dummy.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PRIVY M2 BANKDY FINDY LIQY
lgdppc 1.668 0.0152 5.527* 5.894* -0.317
[4.766] [5.366] [3.224] [3.239] [4.651]
pop 1.513 1.358 0.984 1.124 0.389
[1.860] [2.611] [3.137] [2.985] [2.272]
trade 4.096 2.317 3.986 4.070 2.038
[3.621] [3.664] [3.030] [3.119] [3.547]
gov -1.662 -2.397 -3.670 -3.504 -3.868
[2.551] [2.934] [2.190] [2.222] [2.916]
SH5TO3 -1.634 -1.383 -3.382** -3.440** -3.225**
[1.133] [1.227] [1.518] [1.525] [1.390]
FINDEV -0.0759 -0.0757 -0.259*** -0.257*** -0.268***
[0.0691] [0.0666] [0.0956] [0.0910] [0.0790]
SH5TO3xFINDEV 0.0130 0.00956 0.0699*** 0.0689*** 0.0651**
[0.0156] [0.0178] [0.0252] [0.0246] [0.0292]
Hansen statistic 15.31 16.01 12.53 12.31 14.37
Hansen d.f. 14 14 14 14 14
p-value of Hansen 0.357 0.313 0.564 0.581 0.423
AR(2) test statistic 1.065 0.914 -0.518 -0.444 -1.558
p-value of AR(2) 0.287 0.361 0.604 0.657 0.119
Number of instruments 27 27 27 27 27
Countries 51 52 51 51 51
N 190 193 187 187 187
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.10: SH234 and consumption growth volatility with latin american dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PRIVY M2 BANKDY FINDY LIQY
lgdppc 1.992 3.117 3.961 3.718 1.911
[2.813] [4.455] [3.032] [3.028] [3.017]
pop 3.299* 2.018 0.609 0.677 -0.259
[1.894] [2.145] [2.334] [2.202] [2.073]
trade 3.922* 3.330 2.987 2.944 3.538
[2.224] [2.074] [2.351] [2.357] [2.178]
gov -0.621 -3.164 -2.796 -2.763 -1.967
[2.144] [2.817] [2.816] [2.817] [2.681]
SH234 0.898*** 1.008*** 0.902** 0.918*** 0.775*
[0.321] [0.365] [0.356] [0.335] [0.439]
FINDEV 0.312** 0.680** 0.741 0.759* 0.514
[0.145] [0.334] [0.442] [0.433] [0.516]
SH234xFINDEV -0.00695** -0.0149** -0.0169* -0.0173* -0.0119
[0.00313] [0.00690] [0.00959] [0.00937] [0.0106]
Hansen statistic 10.72 11.89 10.24 10.01 11.97
Hansen d.f. 14 14 14 14 14
p-value of Hansen 0.708 0.615 0.745 0.761 0.609
AR(2) test statistic 0.441 -1.122 -0.818 -0.888 -0.855
p-value of AR(2) 0.659 0.262 0.414 0.375 0.392
Number of instruments 27 27 27 27 27
Countries 51 52 51 51 51
N 190 193 187 187 187
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table A.11: SH23 and consumption growth volatility with latin american dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PRIVY M2 BANKDY FINDY LIQY
lgdppc 1.145 2.418 3.742 3.655 2.078
[2.694] [3.668] [2.394] [2.348] [2.206]
pop 3.011 2.047 0.858 0.920 0.0148
[1.942] [2.494] [2.288] [2.155] [2.070]
trade 3.329 2.749 2.895 2.918 3.285
[2.018] [1.886] [2.022] [2.036] [2.026]
gov -0.228 -2.165 -2.134 -2.124 -1.070
[2.172] [2.695] [2.543] [2.518] [2.520]
SH23 1.101*** 1.241** 1.096** 1.118*** 0.961*
[0.385] [0.508] [0.410] [0.390] [0.505]
FINDEV 0.221** 0.424* 0.443* 0.457* 0.344
[0.0980] [0.233] [0.253] [0.248] [0.323]
SH23xFINDEV -0.00942** -0.0177* -0.0189* -0.0195** -0.0149
[0.00392] [0.00892] [0.00982] [0.00957] [0.0121]
Hansen statistic 11.94 12.49 9.081 8.843 12.22
Hansen d.f. 14 14 14 14 14
p-value of Hansen 0.611 0.567 0.826 0.841 0.589
AR(2) test statistic 0.339 -0.889 -0.623 -0.693 -0.710
p-value of AR(2) 0.735 0.374 0.534 0.488 0.478
Number of instruments 27 27 27 27 27
Countries 51 52 51 51 51
N 190 193 187 187 187
Standard errors in brackets
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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B.1 Maximum durable good stock of constrained
households
Definition B.1.1. Durable good stock dmax0 is the maximum level at which
households -regardless their probability of repayment- are indifferent between
accepting credit offer to purchase durable good or rejecting it and therefore not
buying it.
(1− φ) β γ(1−γ)(1+β)
1− (1− φ) β γ(1−γ)(1+β)
= (1− δ)dmax0
We will proceed to derive this. Remember period utility take Cobb-Douglas
functional form:
U(ct, dt)) =
(
cγt d
1−γ
t
)1−σ
1− σ
Consider its log transformation:
u(ct, dt)) = log(U(ct, dt)) = ψclog(ct) + ψdlog(dt)− log(ψc + ψd)
where ψc = (1− σ)γ, ψd = (1− σ)(1− γ) and ψc + ψd = 1− σ.
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The value of autarky is
vnb(d0, ρ) =u(y1, (1− δ)d0) + βρ u(yH , (1− δ)2d0) + β(1− ρ) u(yL, (1− δ)2d0)
The value of accepting credit offer to purchase durable good is
vb(d0, ρ, z2) =u(y1, 1 + (1− δ)d0) + βρ u(yH − z2, (1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0) + . . .
+ β(1− ρ) u((1− φ)yL, (1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0)
Given durable good stock and probability of repayment, if vb(d0, ρ, z2) ≥
vnb(d0, ρ), then household accepts credit offer and purchases one more unit of
durable good.
Simplifying and rearranging this expression yields
ψd(1 + β) log
(
1 + (1− δ)d0
(1− δ)d0
)
+ βψc log(1− φ)
≥
βρ ψc log
(
yH
yH − z2 (1− φ)
)
Note left hand side of equation above is decreasing in durable good stock.
Then there will be a maximum d0 such that for all values below it, vb(d0, ρ, z2) ≥
vnb(d0, ρ). The value dmax0 solves:
ψd(1 + β) log
(
1 + (1− δ)dmax0
(1− δ)dmax0
)
+ βψc log(1− φ) = β ψc log
(
yH
yH − z2 (1− φ)
)
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Substituting yH(1− φ) = yH − z2 and solving for dmax0 yields the following:
(1− φ) β γ(1−γ)(1+β)
1− (1− φ) β γ(1−γ)(1+β)
= (1− δ)dmax0
If d0 > dmax0 , then value of rejecting credit offer is higher than value of accepting
it, regardless the probability of repayment.
B.2 Repayment value is an increasing function of
z1
The repayment value z2 can be expressed as z1×R, where R = 1/ρ. Note ρ is
the probability of repayment threshold derived from the bank problem.
dz2
dz1
=
1
ρ
− z1
ρ2
dρ
dz1
=
1
ρ
(
1− z1
ρ
dρ
dz1
)
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To get dρ(z1)
dz1
we apply the implicit function theorem on Bank Profits:
ΠB =
∫ a¯
ρ(z1)
(
ρ
ρ(z1)
− 1
)
z1 × f(ρ)dρ− χ = 0
ΠB = − 1
ρ(z1)
∫ ρ(z1)
a¯
ρz1 × f(ρ)dρ+
∫ ρ(z1)
a¯
z1 × f(ρ)dρ− χ
dΠB
dz1
=
∫ a¯
ρ
(
ρ
ρ
− 1
)
× f(ρ)dρ
dΠB
dρ
=
1
ρ2
∫ ρ
a¯
ρz1 × f(ρ)dρ
dρ
dz1
= −dΠ
B/dz1
dΠB/dρ
dρ
dz1
=
ρ2
∫ a¯
ρ
(
ρ
ρ − 1
)
× f(ρ)dρ
z1
∫ a¯
ρ ρ× f(ρ)dρ
=
ρ
∫ a¯
ρ (ρ− ρ)× f(ρ)dρ
z1
∫ a¯
ρ ρ× f(ρ)dρ
> 0
Substituting in dz2/dz1 yields
dz2
dz1
=
1
ρ
− z1
ρ2
dρ
dz1
=
1
ρ
(
1−
∫ a¯
ρ (ρ− ρ)× f(ρ)dρ∫ a¯
ρ ρ× f(ρ)dρ
)
> 0
B.3 Constraint: Cash customer doesn’t buy on
credit
We will prove the following: “If z′1
RV
RBr
> z1, cash customer won’t buy on credit
provided by vendor ”.
Assume z′1
RV
RBr
> z1 and cash customer finances the purchase of one unit of
durable good with credit provided by vendor. Let c∗1 and c∗2 be the optimal first and
second period non durable consumption. Then the first period budget constraint
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is
c∗1 + z
′
1 = y1 + b1 + b
V
1
where b1 is total consumption credit provided by banks and bV1 is consumption
credit by vendor.
The second period budget constraint is
c∗2 = y2 − b1RBr − bV1 RV
Substituting b1 in first period budget constraint yields the lifetime budget
constraint
c∗1 + z
′
1 +
c∗2
RBr
= y1 +
y2
RBr
+ bV1
(
RBr −RV
RBr
)
Note that bV1 = z′1 since credit provided by vendors covers exactly the
subsidized price. Then
c∗1 +
c∗2
RBr
= y1 +
y2
RBr
− z′1
(
RV
RBr
)
Recall that lifetime budget constraint of cash customer not financing purchase
of durable good with vendor credit is
c1 +
c2
RBr
= y1 +
y2
RB1
− z1
Given assumption z′1
RV
RBr
> z1,
c1 +
c2
RBr
> c∗1 +
c∗2
RBr
a contradiction to the statement that cash customer will finance the purchase of
one unit of durable good with credit provided by vendor.
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B.4 Characterizing profits from selling to credit
customers
Profits from selling to credit customers is defined as
Π(z1) =q(z1, χ)(z1 − v)
First derivative with respect to z1
dΠ(z1)
dz1
=q(z1, χ) + (z1 − v)dq(z1, χ)
dz1
=N c × (1−G(ρ(z1)))− (z1 − v)N cdG(ρ(z1)
dρ
dρ
dz1
=N c × (1−G(ρ(z1)))− (z1 − v)N cf(ρ(z1)) dρ
dz1
To get dρ(z1)
dz1
we apply the implicit function theorem on Bank Profits and get
dρ
dz1
=
ρ2
∫ a¯
ρ
(
ρ
ρ − 1
)
× f(ρ)dρ
z1
∫ a¯
ρ ρ× f(ρ)dρ
> 0
Next we prove that
dΠ(z1)
dz1
> 0
dΠ(z1)
dz1
=N c × (1−G(ρ(z1)))− (z1 − v)N cf(ρ(z1))
ρ2 ∫ a¯ρ
(
ρ
ρ − 1
)
× f(ρ)dρ
z1
∫ a¯
ρ ρ× f(ρ)dρ

dΠ(z1)
dz1
=N c
(∫ a¯
ρ
f(ρ)dρ
)
− (z1 − v)N cf(ρ(z1))
ρ2 ∫ a¯ρ
(
ρ
ρ − 1
)
× f(ρ)dρ
z1
∫ a¯
ρ ρ× f(ρ)dρ

dΠ(z1)
dz1
=N c
∫ a¯
ρ
f(ρ)dρ− (z1 − v)f(ρ(z1))
ρ2 ∫ a¯ρ
(
ρ
ρ − 1
)
× f(ρ)dρ
z1
∫ a¯
ρ ρ× f(ρ)dρ

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Note both relations below
∫ a¯
ρ
f(ρ)dρ >
∫ a¯
ρ
ρf(ρ)dρ
z1 − v
z1
f(ρ(z1))ρ >
z1 − v
z1
f(ρ(z1))
(
ρ
∫ a¯
ρ (ρ− ρ)× f(ρ)dρ∫ a¯
ρ ρ× f(ρ)dρ
)
Since... ∫ a¯
ρ ρf(ρ)dρ
f(ρ)ρ
> 1⇒
∫ a¯
ρ ρf(ρ)dρ
f(ρ)ρ
>
z1 − v
z1
We can prove that
∫ a¯
ρ
f(ρ)dρ >
z1 − v
z1
f(ρ(z1))
(
ρ
∫ a¯
ρ (ρ− ρ)× f(ρ)dρ∫ a¯
ρ ρ× f(ρ)dρ
)
This implies dΠ(z1)
dz1
> 0
B.5 Restriction on z1 so that cash customer
purchases
B.5.1 Deriving optimal non durable consumption for the
cash customer
In their two period optimization problem, unconstrained households choose
non durable consumption for their two periods (c1, c2) and whether they purchase
one unit of durable good in the first period or not. That is, they maximize utility:
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max
{c1,c2,Purchase or No Purchase}
u(c1, d1) + βu(c2, d2)
subject to: c1 + z1x1 +
c2
RB1
= y1 +
y2
RB1
d1 = x1 + (1− δ)d0
(B.1)
where z1 is the relative price of durable goods, x1 is units of durable goods
purchased. Remember we assume each household can only but one unit of durable
good.
The first order condition for c1 yields:
u1(c
∗
1, d1) =βu1(c
∗
2, d2)R
B
1
with: c∗2 = R
B
1 (y1 − c∗1 − z1x1) + y2
where u1 be the derivative of the transformed period utility function.
Let cp∗1 be optimal non durable consumption if a household purchases one unit
of durable good. Then, cp∗1 solves
u1(c
p∗
1 , 1 + (1− δ)d0) =βu1(cp∗2 , (1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0)RB1
with: cp∗2 = R
B
1 (y1 − cp∗1 − z1) + y2
(B.2)
Let cnp∗1 be optimal non durable consumption if household doesn’t purchase
any durable good. Then, cnp1 solves
u1(c
np∗
1 , (1− δ)d0) =βu1(cnp∗2 , (1− δ)2d0)RB1
with: cnp∗2 = R
B
1 (y1 − cnp∗1 ) + y2
(B.3)
Assuming period utility takes the Cobb-Douglas functional form (in logs):
u(ct, dt)) = ψclog(ct) + ψdlog(dt)− log(ψc + ψd)
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Then
u1(ct, dt)) =
ψc
ct
(B.4)
Substitute (11) in (9) and the F.O.C solving for cp∗1 is:
ψc
cp∗1
=β
ψc
cp∗2
RB1
with: cp∗2 = R
B
1 (y1 − cp∗1 − z1) + y2
(B.5)
Eliminating common terms and rearranging:
cp∗1 =
1
(1 + β)
[
y1 − z1 + y2
RB1
]
(B.6)
Substitute (11) in (10) and the F.O.C solving for cnp∗1 is:
ψc
cnp∗1
=β
ψc
cnp∗2
RB1
with: cnp∗2 = R
B
1 (y1 − cnp∗1 ) + y2
(B.7)
Eliminating common terms and rearranging:
cnp∗1 =
1
(1 + β)
[
y1 +
y2
RB1
]
(B.8)
B.5.2 Deriving restriction on z1
We consider the log transformation of Cobb-Douglas utility function
u(ct, dt)) = log(U(ct, dt)) = ψclog(ct) + ψdlog(dt)− log(ψc + ψd) (B.9)
where ψc = (1− σ)γ, ψd = (1− σ)(1− γ) and ψc + ψd = 1− σ.
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Let vbr be the value of purchasing the good:
vbr =u(c
p∗
1 , 1 + (1− δ)d0) + βu(RB1 (y1 − cp∗1 − z1) + y2, (1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0)
=ψc log(c
p∗
1 ) + ψd log(1 + (1− δ)d0)− log(ψc + ψd) + . . .
+ βψc log(R
B
1 (y1 − cp∗1 − z1) + y2) + βψd log((1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0) + . . .
− β log(ψc + ψd)
(B.10)
where cp∗1 =
1
(1+β)
[
y1 − z1 + y2RB1
]
.
Let vnbr be the value of not purchasing the good:
vnbr =u(c
np∗
1 , (1− δ)d0) + βu(RB1 (y1 − cnp∗1 ) + y2, (1− δ)2d0))
=ψc log(c
np∗
1 ) + ψd log((1− δ)d0)− log(ψc + ψd) + . . .
+ βψc log(R
B
1 (y1 − cnp∗1 ) + y2) + βψd log((1− δ)2d0)− β log(ψc + ψd)
(B.11)
where cnp∗1 = c
np∗
1 =
1
(1+β)
[
y1 +
y2
RB1
]
.
An unconstrained household will choose to purchase one unit of durable good
as long as:
vbr ≥ vnbr
Substituting in cp∗1 and c
np∗
1 ,rearranging and using log properties yields
ψc log
(
1− z1
y1 +
y2
RB1
)
+ . . .
+ βψc log
1− βz1RB1 /(1 + β)
RB1 (y1 − 1(1+β)
[
y1 +
y2
RB1
]
) + y2

≥
ψd log
(
(1− δ)d0
1 + (1− δ)d0
)
+ . . .
+ βψd log
(
(1− δ)2d0
(1− δ) + (1− δ)2d0 )
)
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Simplifying
log
(
1− z1
y1 +
y2
RB1
)
≥ −ψd
ψc
log
(
1
(1− δ)d0 + 1
)
Exponentiation of both sides
(
y1 +
y2
RB1
)1− ( 1
(1− δ)d0 + 1
)−ψd
ψc
 ≥ z1
Let y1 = y2 = y¯, and since ψdψc =
(1−γ)
γ
then:
(1 +RB1 )
RB1
y¯ Ω(d0, δ, γ) ≥ z1 (B.12)
where
Ω(d0, δ, γ) = 1−
(
1
(1− δ)d0 + 1
)−ψd
ψc
.
Note
d(Ω(d0, δ, γ))
d(d0)
=
1− γ
γ
(
1
(1− δ)d0
)− 1
γ (−1)
(1− δ)d20
< 0
That is, the greater d0 (or the lower y¯), the lower is the upper bound of price
z1 such that cash customer accepts to purchase the durable good.
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B.6 Analytical derivatives
B.6.1 Derivative of probability of repayment threshold with
respect to E(ρ)
To get dρ
dE(ρ)
, we use the implicit function theorem on bank’s optimality
equation
F =
∫ 1
ρ
(ρ− ρ)× f(ρ)dρ− χ
φyH
= 0 (B.13)
dρ
dE(ρ)
= −dF/dE(ρ)
dF/dρ
=
∫ 1
ρ (ρ− ρ)× df(ρ)dE(ρ)dρ∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
> 0 (B.14)
where ρ ∼ Beta(α, β), df(ρ)
dE(ρ)
is the derivative of the density with respect to the
mean of the distribution.
B.6.2 Derivative of probability of repayment threshold with
respect to χ
To get dρ
dχ
we use the implicit function theorem on equation B.13.
dρ
dχ
= −dF/dχ
dF/dρ
=
−(φyH)−1∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
< 0 (B.15)
B.6.3 Derivative of probability of repayment threshold with
respect to φ
To get dρ
dφ
we use the implicit function theorem on equation B.13.
dρ
dφ
= −dF/dφ
dF/dρ
=
χ/(yHφ
2)∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
> 0 (B.16)
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B.7 Deriving marginal cost threshold for
comparative statics
B.7.1 Rise in the mean section
Let
dV F
dE(ρ)
= N c
(
(φyHρ− v)
∫ 1
ρ
df(ρ)
dµ
dρ+
(
φyH
∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ− f(ρ)(φyHρ− v)
)
×
∫ 1
ρ(ρ−ρ)×
df(ρ)
dµ
dρ∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
)
(B.17)
Equivalently,
dV F
dE(ρ)
=
N c∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
(
(φyHρ− v)
∫ 1
ρ
df(ρ)
dµ
dρ
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ+
(
φyH
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ− f(ρ)(φyHρ− v)
)
×
∫ 1
ρ
(ρ− ρ)× df(ρ)
dµ
dρ
)
For dV F
dE(ρ)
> 0 we need
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ
(
φyHρ− v
φyH
∫ 1
ρ
df(ρ)
dµ
dρ+
∫ 1
ρ
(ρ− ρ)× df(ρ)
dµ
dρ
)
>
φyHρ− v
φyH
f(ρ)
∫ 1
ρ
(ρ− ρ)× df(ρ)
dµ
dρ
(∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
)
× ∫ 1ρ (ρ− ρ)× df(ρ)dµ dρ(∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
∫ 1
ρ
df(ρ)
dµ
dρ+ f(ρ)
∫ 1
ρ (ρ− ρ)× df(ρ)dµ dρ
)φyH < −ρφyH + v (B.18)
ρ+
(∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
)
× ∫ 1ρ (ρ− ρ)× df(ρ)dµ dρ(∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
∫ 1
ρ
df(ρ)
dµ
dρ+ f(ρ)
∫ 1
ρ (ρ− ρ)× df(ρ)dµ dρ
) < v
φyH
(B.19)
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B.7.2 Fixed cost section
Let
dV F
dχ
= −N cf(ρ) dρ
dχ
× (φyHρ− v) + q(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)× φyH dρ
dχ
= N c
(
−f(ρ)(φyHρ− v) +
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ× φyH
)
dρ
dχ
(B.20)
Since dρ
dχ
< 0, dV F
dχ
< 0 if,
∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
f(ρ)
> ρ− v
φyH
Equivalently, (
ρ−
∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
f(ρ)
)
φyH < v
B.7.3 Default cost section
Let
dV F
dφ
=
dq(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)
dφ
× (φyHρ− v) + . . .
q(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)φyH
dρ
dφ
+ q(N c, χ, φ, µ, σ2)ρyH
(B.21)
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Substitute in terms and yields
dV F
dφ
= N c
(
−f(ρ)(φyHρ− v) +
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ× φyH
)
dρ
dφ
+N cρyH ×
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ
= N c
(
−f(ρ)(φyHρ− v) +
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ× φyH
)
χ/(yHφ
2)∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
+ . . .
+N cρyH ×
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ
= N c
(
−f(ρ)(φyHρ− v) +
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ× φyH
)
χ
(yHφ2)
∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
+ . . .
+N cρyH ×
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ
(B.22)
Rearranging,
dV F
dφ
=
N c
(yHφ2)
∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
×
((
−f(ρ)(φyHρ− v) +
∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ× φyH
)
χ+ ρ(φyH)
2 ×
(∫ 1
ρ
f(ρ)dρ
)2)
The first derivative is positive (dV F
dφ
> 0) if,
ρφyH
χ
×
(∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
)2
f(ρ)
+
∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
f(ρ)
> ρ− v
φyH
Equivalently,
ρ− ρφyH
χ
×
(∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
)2
f(ρ)
−
∫ 1
ρ f(ρ)dρ
f(ρ)
φyH < v
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C.1 Aggregate resource constraint
Recall resource constraint of ricardian consumer:
Cut + I
u
t − qtDut+1 = Wthut + utKut −Dut − T ut (C.1)
Substitute
Cut =
Ct−λCrt
1−λ , I
u
t = It/(1 − λ), Dut = Dt/(1 − λ), hut = (ht − λhrt )/(1 − λ) and
T ut =
λ
1−λT
r
t :
Ct − λCrt + It + qtgtDt+1 = Wtht − λWthrt + utKt −Dt − λT rt (C.2)
Cancel common terms and use resource constraint of rule-of-thumb-consumer:
Ct + It − qtgtDt+1 = Wtht + utKt −Dt (C.3)
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Use first order conditions of firm to derive:
Wtht + utKt =(1− α)AtKt
α(ht)
1−αΓ1−αt
(1 + (Rt − 1)θ) + αAtKt
α(Γtht)
1−α
=
(1− α)AtKtα(ht)1−αΓ1−αt + (1 + (Rt − 1)θ)αAtKtα(Γtht)1−α
(1 + (Rt − 1)θ)
=
AtKt
α(Γtht)
1−α + (Rt − 1)θαAtKtα(Γtht)1−α
(1 + (Rt − 1)θ)
=
AtKt
α(Γtht)
1−α (1 + (Rt − 1)θα)
(1 + (Rt − 1)θ)
Substitute aggregate output and the equation remain as follows:
Wtht + utKt =
Yt (1 + (Rt − 1)θα)
(1 + (Rt − 1)θ) (C.4)
Substitute (A.1.4) in (A.1.3):
Ct + It − qtDt+1 = Yt (1 + (Rt − 1)θα)
(1 + (Rt − 1)θ) −Dt (C.5)
where aggregate investment is:
It = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt + φ
2
Kt
(
Kt+1
Kt
− µ
)2
(C.6)
C.2 Aggregate Euler equations
Recall aggregate hours and aggregate consumption equations:
ht = λh
r
t + (1− λ)hut (C.7)
Ct = λC
r
t + (1− λ)Cut (C.8)
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Substitute hrt and hut in (A.2.1) with their corresponding first order conditions
to get aggregate labor supply:
ht =
(
Wt
Γt−1τω
) 1
ω−1
→ Wt = Γt−1τωhω−1t (C.9)
Note in equilibrium ht = hrt = hut . Remember that combining optimality and
budget constraint of rule-of-thumb-consumer:
Crt = (τωΓt−1)
−1
ω−1Wt
ω
ω−1 + T rt
Substituting Wt in the previous equation with (A.2.3) yields:
Crt = τωΓt−1ht
ω + T rt (C.10)
Next, isolate Cut in (A.2.2) and substitute Crt with (A.2.4):
Cut =
Ct − λτωΓt−1hωt − λT rt
1− λ (C.11)
We will use this last identity together with hut = ht in the expression for
marginal utility of consumption of ricardian household:
λt = (C
u
t − τΓt−1(hut )ω)−σ
λt =
(
Ct − λτωΓt−1hωt − λT rt
1− λ − τΓt−1(ht)
ω
)−σ
λt =
(
Ct − τΓt−1hωt Ω− λT rt
1− λ
)−σ
(C.12)
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Then, the stochastic discount factor as function of aggregates is
Λt+1,t = β
(
Ct+1 − τΓthωt+1Ω− λT rt+1
Ct − τΓt−1hωt Ω− λT rt
)−σ
(C.13)
where Ω = λ(ω − 1) + 1.
Now, we are able to substitute Λt+1,t in the euler equations of ricardian
households. Recall that capital is solely accumulated by ricardian households.
(
1 + φ
(
Kt+1
Kt
− µ
))
=
Etβ
(
Ct+1 − τΓthωt Ω− λT rt+1
Ct − τΓt−1hωt Ω− λT rt
)−σ(
ut+1 + 1− δ + φ
2
((
Kt+2
Kt+1
)2
− µ2
))
(C.14)
qt = Etβ
(
Ct+1 − τΓthωt Ω− λT rt+1
Ct − τΓt−1hωt Ω− λT rt
)−σ
(C.15)
C.3 Linearized equilibrium conditions
Given that a realization of gt permanently influences Γt; output is
nonstationary with a stochastic trend. We proceed to detrend the non-stationary
variables by normalizing them by trend productivity through period t-1 (i.e
divide by Γt−1) 1. To simplify notation we use lower case letters to denote the
corresponding detrended variable. Remember, however, qt, ut , gt, ht did not need
to be detrended. We denote percentage deviation of detrended variable relative to
its steady state with a circumflex symbol: i.e xˆt.
We solve the normalized model numerically by log-linearizing the first order
conditions and resource constraints around the deterministic steady state. Given
1The detrended variable xt will be denoted as x˜t. This choice of normalization ensures that
if a variable xt is on information set as of t-1, so it is xˆt. Finally, the choice of normalization
does not affect the solution to the model.
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a solution to the normalized equations, we can recover the path of the non
normalized equilibrium by multiplying through by Γt−1.
Households
The aggregate labor supply schedule under GHH preferences, perfectly
competitive labor markets and homogenous labor productivity
hˆt =
1
ω − 1wˆt (C.16)
The log-linearized equation describing optimality of capital investment
Etcˆt+1 − cˆt =Ω
¯˜W
c
(
Ethˆt+1 − hˆt
)
+
λ
γc
(
Ettˆ
r
t+1 − tˆrt
)
+ . . .(
1− Ω
¯˜W
ωc
− λγT
γc
)(
−σ + µφ
σ
gˆt +
βφµ2−σ
σ
Etgˆt+1
)
+ . . .(
1− Ω
¯˜W
ωc
− λγT
γc
)(
βφµ2−σ
σ
Etkˆt+2 −
(
βφµ2−σ
σ
+
µφ
σ
)
kˆt+1 +
µφ
σ
kˆt
)
+ . . .
+
βµ−σu
σ
(
1− Ω
¯˜W
ωc
− λγT
γc
)
Etuˆt+1
(C.17)
The log-linearized capital accumulation equation:
iˆt =
µ
µ− (1− δ) gˆt −
(1− δ)
µ− (1− δ) kˆt +
µ
µ− (1− δ) kˆt+1 (C.18)
The log-linearized aggregate euler equation for debt
Etcˆt+1 − cˆt =Ω
¯˜W
c
(
Ethˆt+1 − hˆt
)
+
λ
γc
(
Ettˆ
r
t+1 − tˆrt
)−(1− Ω ¯˜W
ωc
− λγT
γc
)
gˆt + . . .
+
1
σ
(
1− Ω
¯˜W
ωc
− λγT
γc
)(
Rˆt +
ψd
R
dˆt+1
)
(C.19)
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where ¯˜W ≡ W˜h = τωhω is total (detrended) wage payments in the economy in
steady state, γT ≡ T rY , γc ≡ CY and Ω = λ(ω − 1) + 1.
Firms
The aggregate production function
yˆt = Aˆt + (1− α)gˆt + αkˆt + (1− α)hˆt (C.20)
Capital rental rate equates marginal product of capital
uˆt = (1− α)
(
gˆt + hˆt − kˆt
)
+ Aˆt (C.21)
Labor demand schedule is sensitive to real interest rate under working capital
requirement assumption
(1− α)gˆt + Aˆt + αkˆt − αhˆt = θR
1 + (R− 1)θ Rˆt + wˆt (C.22)
Market clearing and equations closing model
Log linearization of the market clearing condition of the final good around the
steady state yields
(γc)cˆt + γiiˆt + (qµγd)dˆt+1 + (qµγd)qˆt + (qµγd)gˆt =
(
1 + (R− 1)θα
1 + (R− 1)θ
)
yˆt + (γd)dˆt + . . .
−
(
(1− α)θR
(1 + (R− 1)θ)2
)
Rˆt + (γT )Tˆt
(C.23)
Next we present the log-linearization of price of non-contingent debt qt. It is
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a function of real interest rate (R) and is elastic to stock of debt
− qˆt = Rˆt + ψd
R
dˆt+1 (C.24)
C.4 Derivations showing model counterparts
The observables considered are
DATAt =
[
∆ln(Yt),∆ln(Ct),∆ln(It),∆TByt, ln(R¯
∗
t ), ln(S¯t)
]
.
Their corresponding model counterparts:
MODELt =
[
γˆYt , γˆCt , γˆIt , ˆγTByt , Rˆ
∗
t , Sˆt)
]
Lets illustrate the model counterpart for output growth (γˆYt). First note
Yt
Yt−1
= gt−1 Y˜tY˜t−1 . Log linearization yields:
ln
(
Yt
Yt−1
)
− ln(µg) =gˆt−1 + ˆ˜Yt − ˆ˜Yt−1
Then we can define its exact model counterpart:
γˆYt ≡∆ln(Yt) = gˆt−1 + ˆ˜Yt − ˆ˜Yt−1 + ln(µg)
Same applies for consumption and investment log differences.
γˆCt ≡∆ln(Ct) = gˆt−1 + ˆ˜Ct − ˆ˜Ct−1 + ln(µg)
γˆIt ≡∆ln(It) = gˆt−1 + ˆ˜It − ˆ˜It−1 + ln(µg)
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The model counterpart for ∆TB/Y is defined by the following equation in the
model:
γTByt =
1
TByss
exp (TByt − TByt−1)
ln(γTByt) =TByt − TByt−1 − ln(TByss)
ln(γTByt)− ln(γTByss) =TByt − TByt−1
ˆγTByt =∆TByt
Model counterpart for interest rates
Sˆt =− η
(
Aˆt+1 + (1− α)gˆt+1
)
+ ˆSt
Rˆ∗t =ρR∗Rˆ
∗
t1
+ ˆR∗t
Rˆ∗t ≈ln(R∗t )− ln(R∗ss) = ln(R¯∗t )
Sˆt ≈ln(St)− ln(Sss) = ln(S¯t)
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